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Only three times during this century has the United States Congress 
undergone a bipartisan, bicameral review of its internal operations. Those three 
reviews were conducted in 1946, 1970 and most recently in 1992. The 102nd 
Congress enacted legislation in 1992 establishing a Joint Committee on the 
Organization of Congress. Many factors indicated that the time was right to enact 
major congressional reforms, including major budget reforms. This study focused 
specifically on budget reform issues addressed by the 103rd Congress. The three 
primary factors associated with successful reform-an existing problem, public 
support and a catalyst which inspires reform-were present, suggesting that reform 
would be successful. The failure of the 103rd Congress to enact significant budget 
reform legislation can be attributed to the disintegration of those three factors 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States Congress has undergone only three 
significant bipartisan, bicameral reviews of its internal 
operations during the twentieth century (Hamilton, 1993, p.l). 
Those three reviews were conducted in 1946, 1970 and most recently 
in 1992. But only twice in this century, in 1921 and 1974, has 
Congress specifically dealt with major congressional budget reform 
issues (Boren, 1993, p.111). 
In 1992, the 102nd Congress enacted legislation directing the 
103rd Congress to once again review its internal operations. 
During this third bipartisan, bicameral review, many factors were 
present that indicated the time was right to enact major 
congressional reforms, including major budgetary reforms. Was the 
reform effort of the 103rd Congress as successful as previous 
congressional reform efforts? The results of this effort, and its 
implications for future congressional reforms, are the focus of 
this study. 
B. PURPOSE 
The primary purpose and goal of the study is to explain the 
outcome of the budget reform initiatives undertaken by the 103rd 
Congress. To achieve that result, a review of previous successful 
budget reforms is required to determine what factors were present 
to stimulate change. It will also be determined whether those 
factors were present during the reform effort of the 103rd 
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C.  SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The scope of the research will be to examine the congressional 
reform efforts initiated by the 102nd Congress and acted upon by 
the 103rd Congress. The intent is to focus specifically on 
budgetary reform issues. According to Lynch, "Budgeting is largely 
a story of relative legislative-executive strength," (1995, p. 41) 
and that theme will be common throughout this study. An historical 
review of previous congressional budget reform efforts, 
specifically the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
establishes the foundation for the remainder of the study. Other 
significant procedural reforms of Congress discussed include the 
Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970. To explore the 
congressional budget reform package proposed by the 103rd Congress, 
an analysis of the political environment surrounding the attempt at 
reform by the 103rd Congress is necessary. 
D.   METHODOLOGY 
An archival strategy was used because of its advantage in 
analysis of a vast guantity of information. The sources of 
information were primarily secondary. An extensive literature 
search of historical background information included significant 
works by two Congressional budget reform experts, Allen Schick 
and Aaron Wildavsky. The historical perspective of congressional 
budget reform provided the groundwork for the remainder of the 
study. 
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The primary sources for the reform efforts proposed by the 
103rd Congress were congressional records and published articles 
written on the subject as it was occurring. The final report of 
the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was thoroughly 
reviewed to examine the budget reform process in 1992-93, and to 
test the validity of the hypothesis: When three primary factors 
associated with reform—an existing problem, public support and a 
catalyst that inspires reform—are present, successful reform 
occurs. 
E.   ORGANIZATION 
To provide some measures to examine the reform efforts of the 
103rd Congress, Chapter II will provide a historical review of 
other successful congressional budgetary reforms. Entitled 
Historical Account of Budget Reform, it will focus on two major 
budget reform efforts of the twentieth century. 
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was the first such 
reform and provided Congress with its first definitive budget 
innovation in the twentieth century. The second major budget 
reform did not occur for over fifty years, but its impact has been 
dramatic. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 is 
possibly the single most significant change in the congressional 
budgetary process made during this century (Lynch, 1995, p.54). 
Historical Success Factors, the title of  Chapter III, will 
review those factors which may explain why the two major budget 
reforms discussed  in  Chapter  II  were  successful.    The 
effectiveness of the reforms and the reasons underlying their 
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success are important factors or criteria to apply in succeeding 
chapters. 
What constitutes successful reform? The answer depends on a 
variety of complex issues and opinions. For this study successful 
reform is defined as the enactment of legislation which 
significantly changes the budget process. 
Chapter IV, entitled The Political Environment in 1992. will 
describe the mood of American voters and the factors that compelled 
the 102nd Congress to initiate reform. The environment will be 
examined in some detail to gain insight into the nature of the 
reform and the mood of the American electorate. 
A detailed description of the reform effort proposed by the 
103rd Congress is contained in Chapter V. A history of the 
proceedings provides the focal point of this chapter, entitled 
Budget Reforms of the 103rd Congress. 
Outcome of the Reform Effort, the title of Chapter VI, reviews 
in detail the actions taken on the Joint Committee's 
recommendations. The factors that appear to explain the success 
of reform efforts in 1921 and 1974 are employed to examine the 
outcomes of the 1993 reform effort. The chapter also summarizes 
the findings of the research and provides analysis on congressional 
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II. HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF BUDGET REFORM 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The architects of the Constitution, specifically James 
Madison, developed a budget process that was designed "to 
prevent the abuse of power, not be efficient." (White, 1989, 
p.l) During George Washington's administration, his Secretary 
of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, supported a strong 
executive role in the federal budget process. However, under 
Albert Gallatin, a former Congressman, and President Thomas 
Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, the legislative branch 
became the dominant branch of government in federal budget 
matters, and remained so until the twentieth century. 
According to Lynch (1995, p.41), federal budgeting is 
largely a story of relative legislative-executive strength. 
Twice, in 1921 and 1974, major Congressional budget reforms 
addressed the balance of power between legislative and 
executive branches in the federal budget process. 
One of the two major budget reforms, the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921, changed the landscape by increasing 
the power of the president, at the expense of Congress. The 
other, the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, limited 
the President's power concerning expenditures and formalized 
a fragmented congressional budget process. 
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 created two 
significant government agencies, the General Accounting Office 
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Budget). More importantly, the Budget and Accounting Act 
introduced the concept of a National Budget to be submitted 
annually by the President. 
The second significant budget reform occurred over fifty 
years later when Congress passed the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Act of 1974. This law resulted from previous 
reform efforts launched in 1970 and as a response to both 
President Nixon's impoundment actions and the fragmented 
nature of congressional budgeting. The solution, "...was to 
coordinate and centralize congressional consideration of the 
budget." (Rieselbach, 1994, p.65) 
Among the significant results of the Budget and 
Impoundment Act was the strengthening of the congressional 
budget process through centralization of the responsibility 
for budgetary planning. House and Senate Budget Committees 
were established to coordinate the budget process in each 
chamber, and a neutral non-partisan office was created to 
provide critical cost information and analysis concerning the 
budget and the overall US economy. The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) , as it is known, is not the legislative 
eguivalent of Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as many 
people believe. Its role is to be a source of non-partisan 
expertise for Congress, whereas OMB serves the President. 
The Budget and Impoundment Act also introduced the 
concurrent resolution which gave Congress the ability to 
coordinate various portions of the budget, and to consider the 
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broad outlines of the budget earlier in the budget process. 
In other words, the resolution established a means of setting 
general parameters or targets for congressional committee 
action on individual taxation, authorization and spending 
bills. Both of these landmark budget reforms will be examined 
in much greater detail later in this chapter. 
B.   PRELUDE TO THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT 
The movement towards presidential participation in the 
federal budget process began as part of the progressive reform 
movement of the early 2 0th century. Early in his 
administration (1910), President Taft recognized a need for a 
National Budget and appointed a Commission on Economy and 
Efficiency to study methods of transacting governmental 
business. During that time, executive agencies still 
followed the Jeffersonian tradition from the early 1800's of 
preparing their budget estimates and forwarding them to the 
Department of the Treasury for delivery to Congress. 
Deficiency spending was freely permitted, (or at least not 
prevented) and Congress usually felt obliged to appropriate 
additional funds to correct these deficiencies. Furthermore, 
congressional committees were each responsible only for 
specific executive agencies, which led to little or no budget 
coordination in Congress. Of more significance, though, was 
the total absence of the chief executive, the President, in 
the overall governmental budget process. 
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The Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency considered 
a wide variety of issues over the next year and in 1912, 
President Taft released their report to Congress. The report, 
titled "Need for a National Budget," suggested that the 
President should be responsible for collecting budget inputs 
for all executive agencies and submitting a unified budget to 
Congress. The Commission's rationale incorporated two themes 
(1) economy and efficiency, and (2) strengthening democracy. 
(Lynch, 1995, p.40) 
Taft believed that a unified budget would allow the 
President to plan governmental activities to maximize 
resources and improve efficiency. Politically, according to 
Taft, a presidential budget would strengthen the role of the 
executive branch of government by bringing the budget into 
politics as a campaign issue for presidential candidates. 
Voters could then support those presidential candidates whose 
programs they would sponsor. 
The timing of Taft's submission and his budget reform 
proposals was extremely unfortunate. His desire for a 
national budget and for general budget reform were 
unsuccessful because Congress was opposed to the concept of an 
executive budget and, therefore, failed to seriously consider 
the Commission's recommendations. Congressional leaders 
insisted on direct submission of executive department and 
agency budgets to Congress as a way of maintaining minimal 
presidential budget authority. 
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In November 1912, Taft was defeated in the presidential 
elections by his democratic challenger, Woodrow Wilson, and 
with the defeat came a major setback for Taft's budget reform 
proposals. Wilson's early priorities were the appointment of 
his cabinet; he subsequently became concerned with the pending 
war in Europe. As a result, the budget reforms proposed by 
Taft would have to wait for another nine years before they 
were enacted. 
C.   THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 1921 
As World War I drew to a close in 1918, the House of 
Representatives was undergoing a significant fiscal crisis. 
Prior to World War I, federal government revenues and 
expenditures were below $800 million. However, by the end of 
the war, expenditures reached $18.5 billion in fiscal year 
1919 and they were estimated to be $6.4 billion in 1920. 
(OMB, 1993, p. 278) Congressional leaders finally realized 
that the budget mechanisms had to be reorganized to gain 
significant control over national fiscal policy. (Burkhead, 
1956, p. 25) 
In 1919, the House of Representatives established a 
Select Committee to consider alternatives to numerous problems 
of fiscal control.  The committee had three major objectives: 
(1) To  determine  the  feasibility of an executive budget; 
(2) To create a government agency responsible to Congress 
which would audit executive agencies; and (3) To internally 
consolidate the congressional budget system.   The Select 
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Committee agreed early in its existence that a national budget 
system was not only required, but that the need was urgent. 
The issue then became what type of agency should be 
established to administer the national budget. Two opposing 
viewpoints developed, one group supporting the creation of a 
new governmental agency, a Bureau of the Budget, to handle 
budgeting for the President, the other believing that the 
Department of the Treasury could handle the program for the 
President. 
A central issue in the debate was the transfer of budget 
power away from federal agencies. Many felt that the creation 
of a presidential budget would concentrate too much control in 
the Executive branch of government and that the budget would 
no longer represent the desires of the voters of the country. 
This viewpoint was held by many prominent members of the House 
of Representatives, including, Frederick H. Gillet (R-Mass), 
the powerful Speaker of the House. 
On October 21, 1919, those who feared a presidential role 
in the budget process were overwhelmingly defeated by those 
who felt that an executive budget system would "...strengthen 
and improve the ability of Congress to control national 
finances." (Burkhead, 1956, pp.26-27) To overcome the 
objections of many members of the House, and to offset the 
gain of power by the executive branch through the 
establishment of the Bureau of Budget, the legislation also 
created the General Accounting Office (GAO). 
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As the House of Representatives was passing this landmark 
legislation, the Senate was entangled in deliberations over 
the extremely controversial Treaty of Versailles. The Senate 
eventually put the budget legislation on their 192 0 agenda, 
and it was passed with little fanfare or national interest. 
Enactment of the legislation into law was further delayed 
by a Presidential veto in the summer of 1920. President 
Wilson objected to a specific provision in the bill concerning 
the Comptroller General. Wilson opposed the idea that the 
head of the Government Accounting Office, the Comptroller 
General, would serve for fifteen years and could not be 
discharged by the President. Later, in the November 
presidential elections, Wilson was defeated by Warren G. 
Harding, and the legislation was given a second chance. The 
bill was resubmitted for Presidential signature early during 
the Harding administration, and the Budget and Accounting Act 
was signed into law on June 10, 1921. It has been 
characterized by some as "...probably the greatest landmark of 
our administrative history."  (Emmerich, 1971, p. 40) 
By enacting the Budget and Accounting Act, Congress 
attempted to gain fiscal control over national expenditures 
and at the same time yield to the growing interest in 
returning to a more businesslike approach to federal 
budgeting. A review of the significant provisions of the 
legislation follows. 
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1. Presidential Budget Submission 
The legislation provided the procedural framework for the 
submission of a presidential budget working within the 
constraints of the constitutional requirements for the 
separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive 
branches. The first step required the President, with the 
assistance of the new Bureau of Budget, to prepare an annual 
unified budget for the federal government. The budget was to 
be submitted to Congress in January, so that it could 
undertake the second step in the process. 
The second step reguired Congress to review the budget 
and authorize the funds for the programs which it supported 
and approved. Governmental expenditures (spending) were the 
third step of the process. The final step required the newly 
created Government and Accounting Office (GAO) to audit the 
federal accounts and submit routine reports to Congress 
concerning the budget expenditures. 
2. Bureau of the Budget 
The new legislation created the Bureau of Budget (BOB) 
within the Department of the Treasury. The role of the Bureau 
of the Budget is defined in section 909 of the legislation, 
which states: 
The Bureau, when directed by the President, shall 
make a detailed study of the departments for the 
purpose of enabling the President to determine what 
changes (with a view of securing greater economy 
and efficiency in the conduct of public service) 
would be made in (1) the existing organizations, 
activities,  and  methods  of  business  of  such 
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departments or establishments, (2) the 
appropriations, (3) the assignment of particular 
activities to particular services, or (4) the 
regrouping of services. The results of such study 
shall be embodied in a report or reports to the 
President, who may transmit to Congress such report 
or reports or any part thereof with his 
recommendations on the matter covered thereby. 
This legislation significantly strengthened the President 
and created a very powerful agency, the Bureau of the Budget 
(BOB), as a tool for the President. Federal agencies were 
required to submit their budget proposals with supporting 
documentation and analysis directly to BOB, and were prevented 
from direct liaison with Congress. Additional measures 
required federal agencies to submit proposed legislation 
through BOB for critique and analysis. This role alone 
greatly increased presidential power because it became a tool 
for the President to ensure that all executive agencies were 
supporting his administration's policies. 
3.  General Accounting Office 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) was originally 
intended to be an extension of Congress. It was envisioned as 
an auditing agency of Congress, which could routinely examine 
and investigate the expenditures of funds by the agencies of 
the executive branch. In this way, Congress might be ensured 
greater legislative control over federal expenditures and 
policy. 
As a non-partisan nonpolitical agency, Congress believed 
that the General Accounting Office could and would act as an 
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independent government auditor. In addition to its auditing 
responsibilities, GAO was given powers to develop procedures 
for governmental accounting, and in his annual report to 
Congress, the Comptroller General was encouraged to make 
recommendations to improve governmental efficiency in the 
areas of public budgeting. 
But the establishment of the GAO did not compensate for 
the power shift to the executive branch. GAO pre-audit 
responsibilities, including an examination of the budget to 
determine its legitimacy, failed to materialize. Since its 
inception, the GAO has been limited primarily to post-audit 
functions, such as the determination of how efficiently 
federal funds are administered. 
D.    THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1946 
During World War I, the federal budget ballooned from a 
pre-war spending of $850 million to a budget of $18.5 billion 
in FY 1919. However, during World War II, the federal budget 
underwent even more profound expansion. Federal revenues 
increased from a pre-war level of less than $7 billion in 
1940, to more than $50 billion in 1945. (Schick, 1990, p.19) 
To finance the war, taxes were increased and record deficits 
($55 billion in 1943) were incurred.  (OMB, 1993, p.  278) 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 made an 
attempt to solve many budget issues. It called for the 
creation of a Joint Budget Committee (JBC), composed of 
members of the revenue and appropriations committees of both 
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the House and Senate. The JBC was intended to coordinate 
spending and revenue generation while simultaneously 
minimizing the differences between House and Senate budget 
legislation. Although the JBC attempted legislative budgets 
in both 1947 and 1948, both were unsuccessful because the 
committee lacked sufficient staff and the resources necessary 
to create a complete budget. Since it never met any of its 
intended objectives it stopped meeting in 1949. The history 
of the Joint Budget Committee was summarized as follows: 
"The first year, 1947, they failed to agree. The second, they 
reached an agreement but failed to abide by it, and the third, 
they simply gave up trying." (Washington Post, 1988. p. A14) 
There are many reasons for the failure of the JBC, but 
the most significant is that the committee membership was too 
large, over seventy members, making it difficult to manage or 
obtain consensus. Furthermore, there were no procedures for 
the establishment of spending ceilings and no mechanisms to 
enforce them. Many were more concerned with issues in their 
own chamber's committees where they maintained their 
significant power base than they were with the JBC. 
The attempts made by the 1946 Legislative Reorganization 
Act formed the basis for additional reform efforts following 
World War II, and the Act had a number of more specific 
impacts. The legislation did succeed in many ways. Among the 
most  significant  of changes, it prompted requirements that 
15 
ous ate. as en r i at
i er t hil l sl
i i izi ere ous at get
i . l tem t i get
t 8, t er s ccessf l
mi t a f t s
t  plet get. i er et f
en j t o eeti 9. i
i t udget c mi t as ari lo s:
ar, 7, e r e. ,
ent t e i ,
l . ashi t ost, 8. . 14)
er a f , t
ost i t t mi t e bershi as
, r t e bers, aki i lt ana r
t s sus. r ore, er r
a ishm t i i n echani s
h . an er or it i
ber' mi t her aint i i
i t er er it .
te t a  egisl t eorganizat
ct rm si it l orm rt low
orl ar , ct ber f or cifi
pacts. io a ays. on
ost i t ges, pt e ent t
lobbyists register, a reduction in the number of committees, 
and creation of a professional staff for committees. 
E.   THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 19 7 0 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 resulted from 
a 1965-1966 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 
created to conduct a major review of internal congressional 
operations. The legislation was signed into law by President 
Nixon on October 20, 1970. Insofar as budgeting is concerned, 
the Legislative Reorganization Act provided some changes. 
Congress became more open to the public through two 
specific and interesting changes. First, more coverage of 
votes and specific positions taken by the members of Congress 
was available to the American public. Secondly, the 
legislation allowed more radio and television coverage of 
committee hearings in the House, bringing it more in line with 
the Senate. (Boren, 1993, p. 1) 
With regard to budgeting issues, the legislation provided 
some fiscal controls which attempted to integrate Congress' 
fragmented approach to budgeting. It provided for a broader 
approach to fiscal policy and tools for analyzing the total 
impact of federal budget expenditures. 
The major provisions contained in the legislation are 
found under Title II, Fiscal Controls.  These measures: 
(1) Directed the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and 
maintain a standardized data processing system for budgetary 
and fiscal data. 
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(2) Directed the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish 
data on federal programs, activities receipts and expenditures 
to congressional committees when requested. 
(3) Required the President to send Congress a five year 
fiscal forecast of every new and existing federal program. 
(4) Required the President to develop a midyear budget 
review and transmit a supplemental budget with the revisions 
to Congress by June 1 every year. 
(5) Directed the House Appropriations Committee to hold 
hearings on the  budget within thirty days of receipt. 
(6) Required that committee reports include five year 
cost estimates for any program affected by the committee's 
legislation. 
As the political landscape changed during the late 1960's 
and early 1970's, the budget process changes contained in the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 laid the framework for 
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974.    A 
thorough review of that landmark legislation is the focus of 
the remainder of this chapter. 
F.   PRELUDE  TO  THE  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND  IMPOUNDMENT 
CONTROL ACT 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 was a major attempt to overhaul the congressional budget 
process, and to regain congressional control over governmental 
spending. Increased spending for programs initiated during the 
Great Society, combined with escalating expenditures for the 
war in Vietnam, heightened concern in Congress about budget 
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deficits and spending controls. (Boren, 1993, p. 112) The 
legislation built upon the reforms initiated by the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, and responded directly 
to President Nixon's impoundment actions in the early 1970's. 
Many scholars, including Lynch (1995, p.54), believe the 
legislation, "...created a unified congressional budget 
reform, and it made the Congress a coequal branch with the 
executive on budgetary matters." By early 1973, Nixon was 
tied to the Watergate conspiracy and many felt that this was 
a perfect opportunity to strengthen the legislative branch at 
the expense of the executive branch. Nixon's continuing 
battles with Congress, and accusations that he was abusing his 
presidential power through refusal to spend funds appropriated 
by Congress, were key factors in the development of important 
provisions in the legislation. 
G.    CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 19 7 4 
The ten titles of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act established a more coherent 
congressional budget process and revised many procedures in an 
attempt to limit presidential impoundment. Although each of 
the ten titles deals with an important issue, the major 
provisions may be summarized under the four headings below. 
1.  Congressional Budget Committees 
Title I creates a budget committee in each chamber 
responsible for handling all budget resolutions, studying the 
effects of outlays on both existing and proposed legislation, 
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evaluating revenue expenditures, and exercising oversight of 
the Congressional Budget Office (created under Title II). 
To assist them, the Budget Committees receive 
recommendations from the respective legislative committees 
but, in the final analysis, it is the Budget Committees that 
determine overall budget planning targets. The centralization 
of spending and revenue planning was believed to be a vital 
tool to reduce fragmentation and regain congressional control 
over the federal budget.  (Lynch, 1995, p. 56) 
2. Congressional Budget Office 
The purpose of the Congressional Budget Office was to 
provide critical information on budget matters to the two 
newly created budget committees. One of the important 
responsibilities of the CBO was to review the President's 
budget, to discuss the fiscal implications of the budget, and 
provide alternative funding solutions. 
Prior to the creation of CBO, Congress lacked the 
resources to conduct similar analysis to that conducted by OMB 
for the executive branch and, therefore, was at a 
disadvantage in formulating a coherent fiscal policy. The CBO 
provided Congress with a non partisan professional cadre of 
analysts whose forecasts and analysis allow Congress to base 
its decisions on timely and reliable information. 
3. Creation of a New Budget Process 
The procedures for the major portion of the legislation, 
the creation of a congressional budget process, are contained 
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in Title III of the legislation.  A congressional timetable 
was designed to coordinate the appropriations process and 
authorizations with spending totals in the budget.   The 
timetable for the new process is contained in Table 1. 
The legislation directed Congress to approve a first 
concurrent budget resolution (by May 15), which was designed 
to set spending targets on the nineteen functional categories 
Table 1 
Timetable for the Congressional Budget Process Under the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 
(Source: P.L. 93-344) 
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President submits his budget to Congress 
March 15 Committees submit reports to budget 
committees 
April 1 CBO submits report to budget committees 
April 15 First concurrent resolution to each chamber 
May 15 Committees report bills and resolutions 
creating new budget authority.  Congress 





Congress completes action on bills and 
resolutions creating new budget and 
spending authority 
September 15 Congress completes action on second 
concurrent resolution 
September 2 5 Congress completes action on reconciliation 
bill and implements second reguired 
concurrent resolution 
October 1 Fiscal Year begins 
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in the budget. The targets were to be used as a guide by the 
legislative committees in the preparation of authorizing and 
revenue legislation. New budget authority or increases in the 
public debt were not to be considered until after the first 
concurrent resolution was passed. The legislation also set 
a nonbinding limit on five specific categories within the 
budget: outlays, budget authority, revenues, surplus (or 
deficit), and the public debt ceiling. 
The Budget Committees use data provided by the CBO 
concerning the state of the economy and prepare the second 
budget resolution. The second resolution was intended to take 
into account significant developments in the economy or 
legislation enacted since the first resolution was enacted. 
The second resolution was to be passed by September 15, and it 
set binding limits on budget totals. 
Congress also added a procedure called reconciliation, 
to bring spending or revenues within the established budget 
ceilings. Reconciliation requires the Budget Committees to 
instruct the other committees on increased revenues or savings 
required to meet the ceilings. The committees then recommend 
program changes to assemble into a single omnibus 
reconciliation bill to be passed by September 25. 
4.  Other Important Issues 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act also changed 
the budget landscape in many other ways. First, the beginning 
of the fiscal year was changed from July 1 to October 1, to 
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allow both chambers of Congress sufficient time to enact a 
federal budget before the fiscal year began. The legislation 
also standardized items to be included in the presidential 
budget, and directed a standardized system for budgetary data 
reporting. 
Possibly the most intriguing change dealt with the 
approach Congress took towards proposed rescissions and 
deferrals of budget authority. If the president chose to 
rescind or defer funds, he was now required to submit to 
Congress a message explaining his justifications and the 
fiscal impact of his actions. In the case of rescissions, if 
Congress failed to take any action, the funds had to be spent. 
For deferrals, either chamber may pass a resolution 
disapproving the deferral and thereby releasing the funds for 
obligation by the executive agencies. If no action is taken 
by Congress, the deferral remains in effect. 
This impoundment approach is an example of how Congress 
was attempting to diminish presidential power in the budget 
process. Many of the proponents of these reforms believed 
that Nixon's impoundment actions of the early 1970's violated 
the spirit of the Constitution and therefore wanted to prevent 
future occurrences. (Lynch, 1995, p.59) 
H.   SUMMARY 
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 provided Congress 
with its  first definitive budget reform  since the days  of 
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Thomas Jefferson, and transferred significant budget power 
from the legislative branch to the executive branch. 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 centralized and strengthened congressional budget 
planning while simultaneaouslsy limiting the President's power 
of impoundment. 
Why were these two major budget reforms successful? The 
reasons explaining the effectiveness of these reforms and 
their underlying successes are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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III. HISTORICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The factors contributing to the success of the reforms 
discussed in Chapter II provide important criteria to apply in 
examination of the reform attempts of the 103rd Congress. 
This first portion of this chapter describes three factors 
that may explain why the reforms were successful. Each of the 
three factors will be characterized in some detail to provide a 
thorough understanding of its role in fostering successful budget 
reform. The remainder of the chapter will employ these factors as 
part of a thorough examination of the political environment prior 
to the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act and the 1974 Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Act. These factors will also be used to 
conduct a brief examination of the political environment in 1946 
and 1970 prior to the two other legislative reform acts described 
in the last chapter. 
B. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCCESSFUL REFORM 
Elmer B. Staats, the former Comptroller General of the United 
States, stated that, "...budgeting lies at the heart of our 
political process and is subjected to the pressures of the 
political arena and requirements of a changing society." (1980, p. 
2) Considering that remark, what factors can be isolated to 
explain successful budget reform? 
It appears that three factors explain why the two major budget 
reforms were successful.  The factors alone will not guarantee 
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success, but when all three are present, reform has occurred. 
Those three factors are: (1) an existing budgetary problem to 
inspire reform; (2) public support for change; and (3) a catalyst 
to initiate the reform effort. Each is described in detail in the 
next three subsections below. 
1.   Existing Budgetary Problem To Inspire Reform 
Reforms typically do not occur without a significant problem 
to inspire change. Dissatisfaction with the budget process is not 
a new phenomenon. Enactment of the federal budget in fact is not 
accomplished through a single process, but a series of connected 
individual processes or cycles of administrative action and 
decision. Federal budgeting is complex and controversial, and has 
shown strains over the years that many believe could lead to a 
significant governmental breakdown. In fact, many involved with 
the federal budget process believe "...there is convincing 
evidence that the effectiveness of American budgeting has been 
seriously eroded." (Schick, 1990, p.l) 
Few involved with the federal budget process (in either branch 
of government) are satisfied with its operation. Dissatisfaction 
with the process, the deficit and debt, vacillating spending 
priorities, and the time reguired to develop the federal budget, 
have made budget reform a major issue throughout this century. 
The mere existence of budget process problems does not in 
itself promote reform. Many organizational scientists have 
recognized the significance of the problem. "As a precursor to 
change,  a  necessary precondition,  is  the  need  for  the  new 
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system..." (Argyris & Kaplan, 1994, p.86) In other words, once 
the budget process is identified as a problem in itself, the first 
step towards reform has been taken. 
2. Public Support 
The government of the United States was established as a 
democracy, giving American voters a great deal of influence 
concerning the conduct of their elected officials. According to 
Gerald F. Seib, "Voters aren't motivated by some particular 
ideology regarding economic realism, but more a desire to see their 
leaders get things done." (Seib, 1995 p. A12) 
Voters have been known to drastically change the political 
landscape at the polls, and many grass root movements have resulted 
in significant political reforms. Most recently, the "United We 
Stand Movement", initiated by Ross Perot, mobilized American voters 
against the bureaucracy of Washington, D.C. and "politics as 
usual". The growth rate of both the federal deficit and the 
national debt has resulted in an American electorate that wants its 
elected officials to stop overspending, and to balance the federal 
budget. Americans may not understand the complexities of the 
federal budget process, but they do understand its failures. 
3. Catalyst to Initiate Reform 
The desire of the electorate to solve an existing governmental 
problem is, however, insufficient impetus to initiate or guarantee 
successful reform. A third element is required, and that element 
is a catalyst. The catalyst must capture the public's attention, 
and start the reform movement.  In other words, once the first two 
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factors are present, some significant development or event must 
occur to trigger the reform process. 
The catalyst may have a variety of features but, its intensity 
must be great enough to overcome the normal noise of the political 
milieu. It may be of almost any nature of crisis, but, it must be 
closely related to the existing problem which inspires the reform. 
The catalysts in 1921 and 1946 were similar but, they were 
drastically different from the catalysts of 1970 and 1974. Still, 
all were of sufficient intensity to cause successful reforms. 
When the three factors are present,  budget reforms have 
occurred this century.  A review of how these factors stimulated 
reform is presented below. 
C.    BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 19 21 
The three success factors described above were all present 
during the late 1910's and early 1920's and laid the groundwork 
for the successful passage of the Budget and Accounting Act. As 
stated in chapter two, early in his administration, President Taft 
realized a need for a National Budget. His Commission on Economy 
and Efficiency identified significant problems with the federal 
budget process, including deficiency spending and the exclusion of 
the President. This is a clear indication that the first factor, 
a problem which inspires reform, was present. 
In 1910, when President Taft presented the Commission's report 
to Congress it received only minimal attention. However, the 
budget process dilemma resurfaced in 1919, when the House of 
Representatives  established  a  Select  Committee  to  consider 
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alternatives to the problems of fiscal control. The problem had 
grown significantly during the nine-year period because of the 
costs of financing U.S. participation in World War I. It must be 
recalled that federal expenditures rose from below $800 million in 
fiscal year 1914 to over $18.5 billion in fiscal year 1919. 
Congressional leaders finally realized that budget mechanisms had 
to be reorganized to gain significant control over federal fiscal 
policy. This was the catalyst for the initiation of the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921. 
Two factors were then present to stimulate reform, and only 
public support was needed to lead to successful reform. The 
support of the American people for "business minded reforms" was 
very strong immediately following World War I. (Burkhead, 1956, p. 
26) 
Shortly after World War I ended, most Americans wanted a 
return to normal business throughout the United States. In fact, 
Warren G. Harding ran -on a ticket which included the campaign 
slogan "Return to Normalcy," referring to a pre-war return to a 
business-oriented government. Many voters believed that the 
federal government needed to be run in a more business-like manner. 
This belief resulted in public support for budget reforms that 
would prevent deficient spending. The idea had strong popular 
support and many members of Congress who objected to change were 
forced to go along with it.  (White and Wildavsky, 1989, p. 8) 
Taft's belief that a Presidential budget would allow citizens 
to vote for a candidate who could fulfill campaign promises was 
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also appealing to American voters. With the support of the 
American voters, the third factor predicting successful reform was 
in place, and in 1921 the legislation was passed into law. 
The Budget and Accounting Act obviously did not solve the 
problems of control of the federal budget process or deficit 
spending. However, the opinion of many, the reforms contained in 
the Act provided the impetus for additional budgetary changes. 
(Cox, 1995, p. A10) 
D.   LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACTS OF 1946 AND 1970 
After World War II, many of the same conditions that existed 
in 1920 were present. Federal budget process control had not been 
significantly improved and the potential for reform remained. 
Furthermore, after the war, many Americans supported a government 
that could help them attain the "American Dream," e.g., the 
purchase of a home and car. American voters supported free 
enterprise, and a government free from unnecessary budget burdens. 
Two congressional actions during the early 1940's also 
inspired the public to support reform. First, in 1942 Congress 
enacted rationing legislation that greatly angered the American 
voters by excluding Congress from the gasoline rationing program. 
Secondly, the huge deficits incurred during the war had to be 
financed by significant tax increases, and the call for decreased 
taxes was a catalyst for the 1946 legislative reform. 
In 1970, the political environment and budget situation was 
somewhat different from the post-World War II period. The budget 
process still had not been controlled, and the costs of President 
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Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and President Lyndon Johnson's Great 
Society programs and the Vietnam war were beginning to impact the 
budget process. Between 1958 and 1969, the federal government 
suffered deficits in every year except 1960 and 1969. (Historical 
Tables, p. V-15) The first factor supporting reform, a major 
problem, was present. 
The 1960s was also a period of social unrest in the United 
States, and political activism was at an all time high. Many 
Americans protested the Vietnam war with great frequency, and the 
establishment, particularly government, was being challenged by 
many members of society. Reforms to change the ways of "doing 
business" in Washington were of interest to American voters. The 
second criterion of public support was also present. 
The catalyst for the reform was probably the high cost of the 
Vietnam War, both in terms of American lives and defense dollars. 
In 1967, the Johnson administration projected a 1968 deficit of 
five and a half percent of federal outlays, ($25 billion). 
Furthermore, the deficit was projected to grow to eleven percent of 
federal outlays by fiscal year 1971. (White, Wildavsky, 1989, p. 
11)  The cost of the Vietnam War was to be significant. 
Early in 1968, President Johnson suffered two embarrassing 
defeats in the first Democratic primaries, and shortly thereafter 
withdrew from the election. The American voters wanted to end the 
American involvement in Vietnam, and they had sent a very clear 
signal to their elected officials in Washington, to change the way 
they did business. Congress got the message and attempted to enact 
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change quickly.  They drew upon their 1965 study of legislative 
reforms, updated them and passed them into law as the Legislative 
Reform Act of 1970.  The three reform criteria were in place, and 
the Act was signed into law by President Nixon. 
E.   CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 19 7 4 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
also was stimulated by the three factors during the reform effort. 
Throughout his first term in office, President Nixon continually 
battled with Congress over his authority to impound money that was 
already authorized and appropriated for expenditure. Nixon 
believed it was the duty of the chief executive, and routinely 
impounded federal money authorized and appropriated by Congress. 
The continual budget battles between the executive and legislative 
branch indicate clearly that the budget process had underlying 
problems which needed to be resolved. The first criterion was in 
place in 1974. 
Nixon's second term resulted from a landslide victory in the 
November, 1972 presidential election; the Watergate scandal was 
still in its infancy. In 1973, Nixon used his landslide victory to 
propel his policy concerning federal spending.  "This Congress has 
not been responsible on money, the difficulty is that the 
Congress represents special interests." (Cranford, 1995, p. 2339) 
This battle between the President and Congress over the purse 
strings actually began during Nixon's first term. By mid-1973, 
Nixon was linked to the Watergate scandal, and the mood of the 
American voters became one of distrust towards the President.  He 
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was called a criminal by early 1974 and impeachment was considered 
by many members of Congress. By the summer of 1974, President 
Nixon's credibility was destroyed, and many American voters were 
calling for reform to check the chief executive's authority. 
Voters would not stand for a President who considered himself to be 
above the law.  The second criterion, voter support, was present. 
The catalyst for the reform effort was also the result of 
President Nixon's actions. His repeated impoundments for policy 
reasons and his blatant battles with Congress led many to believe 
that his actions and presidential power in general needed to be 
checked. Public support for Nixon was weak, but, "...the sense 
that Congress had to get its fiscal house in order was nonetheless 
widespread."  (Cranford, 1995, p. 2340) 
During the 1972 election campaign, President Nixon asked 
Congress for authority to cut federal spending at his own 
discretion to stay below the $250 billion debt ceiling for fiscal 
year 1973, a ceiling that he recommended. The House supported his 
actions, but the Senate refused to support the ceiling. The 
President responded by vetoing legislation he felt was 
inflationary, which escalated the crisis. Some vetoes were 
overridden, but shortly thereafter, Nixon began impounding funds. 
Among the major impoundments were $6 billion for sewage treatment 
grants to the states, and over $2.5 billion appropriated from the 
highway trust fund. 
Although impoundment had been a common practice of Presidents 
since the early days of the nation, Nixon's approach was much more 
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aggressive in a policy sense than that of his predecessors.   Many 
scholars  viewed  his  actions  as  unnecessarily  antagonistic. 
According to White and Wildavsky (1989, p. 12): 
"If Nixon could get away with massive impoundments, what 
could he not do? If the power of the purse could be 
defied, what was left for Congress? The world had been 
stood on its head. Since the time of the royal governors 
and their civil lists, the legislature's problem had been 
to restrain the executive, limiting its funds. Now, it 
faced an executive who wanted to spend too little, who 
defied the legislature (which so far as Congress was 
concerned, meant the people)..." 
The Act redefined the President's impoundment authority and by 
doing so, this power of the executive branch was greatly reduced. 
As stated by Representative Ullman, "The answer to impoundment 
can't be merely political... It's got to be structural in the 
Congress." (Cranford, 1995, p. 2340)  Nixon's actions resulted in 
decreasing the power of the President, and were the catalyst that 
initiated passage of the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. 
F.   SUMMARY 
Three factors help to explain why the two major budget reforms 
discussed in Chapter II were enacted. Those factors are perception 
of an existing budgetary problem, public support for change, and a 
catalyst to initiate the reform effort. These three factors are 
criteria to be used in the examination of the reform attempts of 
the 103rd Congress. 
The same approach will be applied in the next chapter, 
entitled The Political Environment in 1992. The roles that these 
factors played during the reform effort of the 103rd Congress are 
of considerable importance to this study. 
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IV. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1992 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The political environment in 1992 provides many clues 
about the nature of the reform effort proposed by the 102nd 
Congress. What was the mood of the American electorate? Were 
they willing to support substantial reform, or were they 
disinterested in the federal budget process? Was there a 
catalyst to initiate a major congressional reform effort? 
This chapter addresses those questions, and explains why 
Congress was compelled to initiate reform in 1992. 
Significant problems such as the federal deficit and 
debt, decision gridlock and the ineffectiveness of Congress 
led to emergence of a major populist reform movement in 1992. 
By the early 1990's the federal debt was over $3 trillion and 
Congress received a great deal of blame for this burden on 
taxpayers. Congress also had experienced several major 
scandals that caused many of its most talented members to 
retire early. Each of these were instrumental to stimulate 
the 102nd congressional reform legislation and each will be 
examined in significant detail. 
B.   GRIDLOCK 
By the late 1980s there was a perception among American 
voters that their federal elected officials could not solve 
the problems facing the nation. This inability to solve major 
issues, especially the deficit problem, is known as gridlock. 
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Gridlock actually results from three separate factors-divided 
government, rejection of business as usual, and the complexity 
of the issues facing politicians today. 
The distinction between separation of powers and divided 
government is important to the understanding of the 
electorates mood in 1992. The founders of the Constitution 
strongly believed in a government where powers were dispersed 
among the three branches, legislative, executive and 
judicial. On the other hand, divided government is defined as 
the executive and legislative branches under control of two 
different political parties. There have been very few times 
during the last fifty years where America has not lived under 
divided government. Having lived under divided government 
since 1980, Americans opted to put the Democratic party in 
control of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue as a way of ending 
gridlock. 
The Democratic party's ability to gain control of both 
the White House and Congress in 1992 was due in large part to 
their ability to overcome a great deal of political rhetoric. 
Throughout the 1980's the Democrats were effectively labeled 
as a party of liberals whose fiscal philosophy was "tax and 
spend". By mid-1992, during the height of the presidential 
election, Americans were becoming increasingly fed up with the 
political finger-pointing and increased rhetoric, and began to 
look to Washington outsiders for help. The call for change 
was demonstrated at the polls.  Over twenty percent of the 
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House Members of the incoming 103rd Congress would be 
freshmen, a result of retirement and a rejection of 
incumbents. In contrast, only 14 of 4 06 House incumbents were 
defeated in the 1990 election. (Congress and the Nation, 1992, 
p. 354) 
The final element contributing to gridlock was the number 
and complexity of issues facing the government, especially 
fiscal issues. During the Reagan-Bush years the federal 
deficit ballooned and became a major political issue. Table 
2 reflects the growth of the deficit over that period. The 
inability of Congress and the White House to correct the 
budget process and resolve the deficit during those years was 
Table 2 
Federal Budget Deficit 1981 - 1991 




($ in mils) 
As % of GNP As % Of 
Outlays 
1981 78,936 2.6 11.6 
1982 127,940 4.1 17.2 
1983 207,764 6.3 25.0 
1984 185,324 5.0 21.8 
1985 212,260 5.4 22.4 
1986 221,167 5.3 22.3 
1987 151,436 3.4 22.5 
1988 153,920 3.2 22.1 
1989 155,100 3.0 22.1 
1990 218,380 4.0 22.9 
1991 270,096 4.8 23.5 
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strong evidence to many American voters that Washington was in 
gridlock and unable to solve the nation's problems. 
The deficit and gridlock were not the only problems 
facing politicians in the early 1990's. As already mentioned, 
Congress was suffering through two significant problems, 
internal dissatisfaction and a series of scandals which hurt 
its effectiveness. Congressional effectiveness is the subject 
of the next section of this chapter. 
C.   EFFECTIVENESS OF CONGRESS 
Congress, as an institution, has been and remains an 
enigma to much of the American public. Americans do not 
understand its complicated committee system, nor do many 
understand the bicameral system created by the founders of the 
Constitution. This lack of understanding has often kept 
American voters uninterested in Congressional effectiveness or 
reform. 
Public ignorance and apathy aside, two significant 
developments have hurt the effectiveness of Congress. First, 
members' disillusionment has led to an internally driven 
reform movement and early retirement of many. Secondly, 
"Congress bashing" resulted from five significant scandals 
that began in the late 1980's and continued into the 1990's. 
These factors helped put Congress in a, "...dark period of 
introspection that could produce the biggest push for 
institutional reform in a generation." (Hook, 1992, p. 1579) 
Each will be reviewed in this chapter. 
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1.   Internal Disappointment 
Because of low public opinion ratings and the inability 
of Congress to accomplish significant results, many members 
have become increasingly reform-minded. By early 1992, many 
of the most respected members of both the House and Senate 
were calling for major changes in the way Congress completes 
its legislative agenda. (Hook, 1992, p. 1579) The call for 
change is a clear indication that members are generally 
dissatisfied with the workings of Congress. 
Early calls for reform in 1992 were widespread and 
included every facet of congressional operations. Many 
supported the idea of a Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress which would develop a bipartisan solution to improve 
the legislative operations of Congress. The same approach was 
effective in 1946 and 1970 as described in previous chapters. 
The need to streamline the legislative process was 
incredibly evident during the passage of the Clean Air Act in 
1990. The Bill was handled by seven committees in the House 
alone, and over 140 House members were involved in the 
conference committee with the Senate before the final 
legislation was determined and sent to President Bush for 
signature. 
Senator Pete Domenici, (R-NM), was one of the first to 
admit reform was necessary. Considered to be the most 
knowledgeable Senator on issues regarding the federal budget 
process and deficit,  he was quoted as feeling utterly 
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powerless to reduce the deficit. (Hook, 1992, p. 1579) In the 
early 1990's Domenici criticized Congress for being 
inefficient and unproductive, noting that only 6.3 percent of 
bills introduced became public law during the 101st Congress 
(1989-1990). (Pauls, 1992, p. 3) 
Members of the House of Representatives were equally 
frustrated during the same period. Representative Lee 
Hamilton, (D-IN) noted that American voters were losing faith 
in Congress, and that the time had come for another 
comprehensive examination of how Congress works or fails to 
work.  (Pauls, 1992, p. 4) 
Other members of both chambers were less optimistic than 
their contemporaries and opted to retire instead of remaining 
aboard the "sinking ship". Prominent members of both the 
House and Senate retired early, and offered as the reason, the 
inability of Congress to accomplish any meaningful legislation 
or agenda. By the November 1992 elections, 53 House members, 
and eight senators had voluntarily retired, and another 19 
House members and one senator were unseated by their 
constituents. The Freshman Class of the 103rd Congress would 
be greatly affected by the scandals that led to many of those 
departures. 
2.   External Pressures 
By 1992, American voters were frustrated with 
congressional scandals. Five significant scandals helped 
propel American voters towards reform during the election year 
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of 1992. The Savings and Loan collapse and the subsequent 
bailout was still haunting many Americans, and they were in no 
mood for additional improprieties by their elected officials. 
The American public soon was aware of four major scandals, two 
in each chamber. These scandals helped instigate a major 
reform movement in 1992. Each of the five scandals will be 
reviewed in some detail to accurately establish the mood of 
the electorate in 1992. 
a.   The Savings and Loan Crisis 
The Savings and Loan crisis was first uncovered in 
May 1988 when a General Accounting Office report found 505 of 
the nation's 3,147 thrifts were insolvent at the end of 1987. 
The insolvent thrifts were primarily located in the Southwest 
where the depressed oil industry was hit the hardest. 
Within a month of his inauguration, President Bush 
proposed legislation overhauling the $100 billion thrift 
industry. The bill dramatically restructured federal 
regulations concerning thrifts and created the Resolution 
Trust Corporation (RTC). The RTC was initially provided $50 
billion over three years to sell off the insolvent savings 
institutions, and was created to take over any additional 
failed thrifts and sell their assets. From its inception 
until 1993, the RTC took control of 727 failed savings and 
loans at a cost of more than $86 billion. (Congress and the 
Nation, 1992, p. 116) 
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The Senate entangled itself in two significant 
public affairs "nightmares" in 1991. First, the Keating Five 
scandal led the Senate Ethics Committee to rebuke five 
senators for improper contacts with federal regulators 
concerning a financially troubled savings and loan 
institution. Later that same year, the Senate immersed itself 
in the debacle over the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court 
nominee Clarence Thomas. 
b.        Keating Five Scandal 
The Keating Five scandal dated back to the mid 1980s 
and involved five Senators who were charged with doing favors 
for a wealthy campaign contributor, Charles Keating. Keating 
was the head of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association that 
failed in 1989 and cost taxpayers over $2 billion. The five 
senators, Alan Cranston, (D-CA), Dennis DeConcini, (D-AZ), 
John McCain (R-AZ), John Glenn, (D-OH), and Donald Riegle Jr., 
(D-MI) received over $1.5 million from Keating and all denied 
wrongdoing. 
The Senate began televised ethics hearings in 
November 1990, and concluded them two months later. Just 
prior to the commencement of the hearings, Cranston announced 
he was retiring, and would not seek reelection in 1992. The 
five senators were admonished by the Ethics Committee but 
Cranston was the only one punished for his role in the affair. 
Keating was eventually found guilty on 73 counts of fraud and 
racketeering and sentenced to more than 525 years in prison. 
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c.       Clarence Thomas  Confirmation Hearings 
In October 1991, the Senate once again became 
embroiled in a wild spectacle, the televised confirmation 
hearings of Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas. Thomas, 
President Bush's nominee to succeed Thurgood Marshal, was 
thought to be an easy confirmation, but two days before the 
scheduled vote Thomas was accused of sexual harassment by 
Anita Hill, a former employee. The vote was delayed, and 
three days of television hearings began October 11, 1991. The 
hearings became a major satire and source of public scorn for 
the Senate. 
Hill recounted numerous humiliating sexual 
harassment incidents during the early 198 0s when she worked 
for him. Hill's testimony was believed by many senators, but 
Republican senators and the White House attacked her 
credibility. Thomas responded as a man wrongly accused, with 
his reputation and family destroyed. Thomas was eventually 
confirmed by the closest margin in history, 52-48. 
The House of Representatives was also suffering 
through two embarrassing scandals. First, the House Post 
Office scandal began as a small investigation and exploded 
into a major scandal involving several prominent members. The 
second scandal involved the House Bank. The American public 
learned in 1991 that hundreds of current and former members 
took advantage of the House bank and were routinely overdrawn 
without penalty.   The scandal mushroomed and eventually 
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involved more members than any other ethics controversy in 
congressional history. (Congress and the Nation, 1992, p. 346) 
d. House Post  Office  Scandal 
The House Post Office scandal resulted from a minor 
investigation and eventually led to the demise of a major 
House member, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski. The investigation turned up allegations of 
improper loans and check-cashing. Members of the House were 
accused of submitting phony stamp transactions and pocketing 
the cash. Rostenkowski purchased over $27,672 worth of stamps 
between January 1986 and March 1992. The inquiry continued 
well into 1993, and Rostenkowski was voted out of office in 
the 1994 congressional elections and later tried in court 
because of his involvement. 
e. House Bank Scandal 
In 1991 the public became aware of the House Bank 
scandal in which hundreds of current and former members of the 
House routinely overdrew their House checking accounts without 
penalty. In September 1991, the General Accounting Office, 
in a follow-up audit from 1988, disclosed that 8,331 bad 
checks had been written by members during a one year period in 
1990. The House Ethics Committee released the list of members 
who were routinely overdrawn. The elections of 1992 indicated 
public displeasure with the House members involved in the 
scandal.  Over 25 percent (77 of 269) of the current members 
44 
n or e bers t r t r
gressi al i . gres ati , 2, . ) 
ous st ffi al l rom i r
st t all is f aj r
ous e ber, ays eans c mi t hai a
ost ski. st e f
r er - as i . embers f ous er
itt tam a et
. ost ski r , ort f a s
ar 2. i t
ell 3, ost ski as t t f f
gressi al ie rt
i n ent.
.
bli ar f ous a
al hi r r t er e bers f
ous t e i ous i nt it t
alt . ber 1, eneral ccounti fi e,
low it rom 8, t
rit e bers r r r
0. ous t i mi te f e bers
er t n. f  
bli it ous e bers
dal. ver r t ) f r t e bers
involved  in the scandal had retired or been defeated. 
(Congress and the Nation, 1992, p. 346) 
By early 1992, the election rhetoric was heating up 
and American voters were looking for a change and an 
"unconventional" candidate. Many Americans were bitter that 
their elected officials could not break the gridlock and solve 
the budget deficit. In response, Ross Perot and his "United 
We Stand" movement was created in 1992. 
D.   UNITED WE STAND MOVEMENT 
In 1992 a Texas billionaire, Ross Perot became the 
catalyst for a populist reform movement across the United 
States. Perot campaigned on the belief that both Republicans 
and Democrats lacked the will and ability to address the major 
issues facing America. Perot's main selling points were the 
federal deficit and the inability of federal politicians to 
work together to solve other major problems. He also appealed 
to many Americans by suggesting the elimination of special 
interest group participation in campaign financing. 
Perot took a plain talking approach with a simple message 
for change to the American people. Perot often stated that if 
the voters of America wanted to get down to business, they 
should vote for him, if they wanted to "talk and slow dance" 
they should vote for Bush or Clinton. (Seib, 1995, p. A12) 
Perot's message struck a chord with many American voters 
and many became Perot volunteers. During the early days of 
the campaign season, Perot drew major support.  Exit polls in 
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three major primaries in New Jersey, Ohio and California found 
Perot drawing significant support from delegates supporting 
Bill Clinton, the leading Democratic candidate and incumbent 
Republican President George Bush. 
Many volunteers gathered signatures to add Perot to the 
federal ballot in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. By early June, Perot had hired two major campaign 
managers, Democrat Hamilton Jordan and Republican Edward 
Rollins. Each had experience running a successful major 
presidential election campaign. By the early days of 
summer, Perot was projected as drawing over thirty percent of 
the popular vote in a three way race. 
Perot's campaign was unique because he made no campaign 
appearances. He relied instead on talk-show appearances, and 
was a pioneer in the use of " inf omercials, » 30 minute campaign 
commercials. 
By mid-summer, Perot's support began to falter and he 
suddenly withdrew from the election in July.  His official 
rationale was objection to intense political scrutiny of his 
personal life.  Almost as abruptly, he reentered the race in 
October, allowing him to participate in the three presidential 
debates. His performance in the debates was mixed, but he did 
gain in the polls during the final weeks of the campaign. 
Perot's impact is still felt today through his »United We 
Stand America" volunteer organization and as a catalyst for 
reform. 
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The volunteer organization, United We Stand America is 
still active today. This organization had more than sixty 
major offices across the United States and each was given 
$7,500 a month from Perot's personal fortune. By the November 
election, many estimate that Perot had spent approximately $18 
million of his own money for the election. (Congress and the 
Nation, 1992, p. 25) 
As a catalyst for reform, Perot had even more impact. 
The agenda of most of his supporters included balancing the 
budget and reforming the way the federal government worked. 
Both of those items became major campaign issues by the fall 
of 1992, and continued throughout the 102nd Congress. 
On election day, Perot won 19 percent of the popular 
vote, but no electoral votes. Perot's candidacy is credited 
with increasing voter participation. Compared to the 1988 
election, voter turnout increased by over 13 million votes, 
the largest increase in over forty years. The 1992 election 
drew over 104 million voters, the first time in American 
history that voter turnout exceeded 100 million. The Voter 
Research and Surveys (VRS), using exit polling, found that 
approximately 15 percent of Perot's voters would not have 
voted had Perot not run. 
Perot's calls for reform were well received across the 
nation. He drew more than 10 percent of the popular vote in 
4 9 states,  and drew more than 2 0 percent  in 3 0  states. 
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(Congress and the Nation, 1992, p. 23)  He also finished ahead 
of Bush and Clinton in one state each. 
E.   SUMMARY 
Significant problems including the growing federal 
deficit and debt, decision gridlock, and the ineffectiveness 
of Congress led to development of a major populist reform 
movement in 1992. Congress had been the victim of several 
major scandals that caused many talented members to retire. 
A charismatic third party candidate, Ross Perot, was the 
catalyst for the nationwide reform movement. The 
congressional reform effort proposed by the 103rd Congress is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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V.  BUDGET REFORMS OF THE 103RD CONGRESS 
A.   BACKGROUND 
As already stated in Chapter IV, the time was right in 
1992 for a major institutional review of congressional 
procedures. More than twenty years had passed since the last 
reorganization act and nearly fifty years since the post World 
War II reforms. Most of the issues facing Congress during 
the last fifty years had changed drastically, yet the internal 
organization and structure of Congress had not. 
Americans were increasingly frustrated with the perceived 
inability of Congress to solve the nation's problems. By the 
early 1990's many members of both chambers opted to resign 
rather than remain members of such an ineffective legislature. 
The disenchantment was not contained to members of the House 
and Senate. By the summer of 1992, public opinion polls 
indicated that seventy-seven percent of Americans disapproved 
of Congress. (Congress and the Nation, 1992, p. 341) 
B.   ENACTING LEGISLATION 
In response to both the internal and external pressure, 
four members of Congress introduced legislation to create a 
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. The House 
legislation, House Concurrent Resolution 192, was sponsored by 
Representative Lee H. Hamilton, (D-IN), and Representative 
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Concurrent Resolution 57, was sponsored by Senator David L. 
Boren, (D-OK), and Senator Pete V. Domenici, (R-NM). 
The resolutions received little negative publicity, and 
moved quickly through both chambers. The House passed the 
legislation by a vote of 412-4 in mid June 1992. The Senate 
approved the legislation on July 30, 1992, with one amendment. 
The conference committee resolution was quickly produced, and 
the final bill was the version approved by the Senate. On 
August 6, 1992 the legislation was formally adopted as House 
Congressional Resolution 192 of the 102nd Congress. 
The legislation required Congress to, ". . .make a full and 
complete study of the organization and operation of the 
Congress of the United States". (House Congressional 
Resolution 192 of the 102nd Congress) A 28 member temporary 
committee was formed to address how to make Congress more 
effective, accountable, and credible. This Joint Committee 
was to recommend improvements to strengthen the effectiveness 
of Congress, simplify its operations, improve its 
relationships with and oversight of other branches of the 
government, and improve the orderly consideration of 
legislation. Interestingly enough, the legislation did not 
grant the Joint Committee any legislative authority to report 
a bill directly to the floor. 
1.   Effectiveness 
How difficult is it to make Congress more effective? The 
answer is, surprisingly difficult!  Issues that needed to be 
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examined included committee assignments, the budget process, 
time available to review legislation, and staffing levels. 
Prior to the first meetings of the Joint Committee, many 
difficult questions had to be addressed, such as: Is Congress 
making adequate use of information technology to help in the 
lawmaking process? Do members spend serve on too many 
committees? Does Congress spend too much time making the same 
budget decisions and too little time reviewing how the money 
is spent and policy is executed? 
2. Accountability 
Many observers have argued that Congress is not held 
accountable for its action. Yet the voters seldom hold 
Congress accountable during elections, returning most 
incumbents to office. The issue of public accountability was 
a major focus of the Joint Committee, and generated such 
issues as: Does the complexity of the budget process make 
accountability difficult? Is there sufficient accountability 
concerning entitlement spending and the federal deficit? 
3. Credibility 
The perceived credibility of Congress is greatly affected 
by the first two issues, effectiveness and accountability. 
Improvements in these two areas could lead to significant 
improvement in credibility. Public criticism of Congress, 
although at an all time high in 1992, was in response to a 
series of congressional scandals over the previous decade. 
Congress's inability to comply with the laws it passes for 
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others,  and the ethical violations of some members were 
factors affecting low public opinion.  The Joint Committee 
certainly had a wide range of issues to consider. 
C.   ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE 
Membership of the twenty-eight member Joint Committee was 
determined by the party leaders in both chambers. The co- 
chairmen were Senator David L. Boren and Representative Lee H. 
Hamilton. Vice chairmen positions were assigned to Senator 
Pete V. Domenici and Representative Bill Gradison. In 
addition to the membership contained in Table 3, the majority 
and minority party leaders in both chambers were granted ex 
officio, voting membership on the committee. 
Table 3 
Joint Committee on the Organization 
of Congress Membership 
(Source: Report On The Organization of Congress, House 
Report 103-413/Senate Report 103-215, Vol II) 
Senate Members House Members 
Jim Sasser (D-TN) David Obey (D-WI) 
Wendell H. Ford (D-KY) Al Swift (D-WA) 
Harry Reid (D-NV) Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) 
Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD) John M. Spratt, Jr. (D-SC) 
David Pryor (D-AR) Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) 
Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) Robert S. Walker (R-PA) 
Trent Lott (R-MS) Gerald B. H. Solomon (R-NY) 
Ted Stevens (R-AK) Bill Emerson (R-MO) 
William S. Cohen (R-ME) Wayne Allard (R-CO) 
Richard D. Lugar (R-IN) Jennifer Dunn (R-WA) 
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Shortly after the first organizational meeting on January 
6, 1993, the committee membership underwent a significant 
change. Representative Gradison resigned from the House of 
Representatives on January 31, and was replaced by 
Representative David Dreier (R-CA) as House Vice Chairman. 
During the first organizational meeting the committee 
established its schedule. During the first six months of 
1993, the committee scheduled over 3 0 hearings, and intended 
to solicit testimony from more than 2 00 witnesses. To support 
their efforts, the committee also anticipated participating in 
several symposia and outside studies. To ensure a high 
quality product, the committee also surveyed both members of 
Congress and their staffs, and communicated with numerous 
other agencies and groups to obtain their inputs on reform. 
The committee agreed to focus their efforts into eight 
major areas concerning congressional reform: ethics process 
and institutional integrity; the federal budget process; 
committee system; floor deliberation and scheduling; staffing; 
working relationships between the branches, parties and 
chambers; public understanding of Congress; and information 
technology and its use in the law making process. As 
mentioned in Chapter I, this study will focus only on those 
issues concerning the budget process. The primary 
recommendations of the Joint Committee concerning budget 
reform are contained in the next section of this chapter. 
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Cumulatively, the Joint Committee held 36 hearings 
containing more than 110 hours of testimony during the first 
six months of 1993. Eight of those hearings were general, 
designed to solicit input and comments from current and former 
members and staff about various reform measures. The 
remainder of the hearings were focused on the eight topic 
areas listed above. The final report of the Joint Committee 
lists a total of 243 witnesses: 133 House Members, 37 
Senators, 14 former members, 15 staff members, and 44 outside 
experts. A summation of the hearings concerning budget reform 
is provided later in this chapter. 
The hearings sponsored by the Joint Committee were 
supported by a variety of other information gathering 
activities. The Joint Committee organized four roundtable 
discussions, on the budget process, the committee system, 
staffing and legislative-executive relationships. These 
discussions were organized with the assistance of The American 
University and The Council on Excellence in Government. 
During the four symposia more than 100 participants provided 
their ideas on reform. A brief summary of the roundtable 
discussions is contained in this chapter. 
In addition to the hearings and symposia, the Joint 
Committee surveyed members and their staff on specific reform 
proposals and issues which should be brought to the attention 
of the Committee. The Congressional Research Service and the 
Congressional  Management  Foundation  were  the  primary 
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assistants in this project. The validity of the surveys was 
hindered by the low return rate among members. Only thirty 
percent of members returned the questionnaires, whereas almost 
fifty percent of staff members responded. The viewpoints of 
the respondents are provided in this chapter. 
Input from American citizens was considered a very high 
priority, and the Joint Committee made a significant effort to 
keep the public informed of its activities. Committee 
hearings were televised on C-SPAN, and letters were sent to 
1,600 daily newspapers requesting readers to let the Committee 
know their opinions concerning reform. More than 1,000 
letters were received from citizens in response to the C-SPAN 
hearings and newspaper articles. 
Three prestigious institutions, the Brookings Institute, 
the American Enterprise Institute, and the Carnegie Commission 
on Science, Technology and Government also greatly assisted 
the work of the Joint Committee. These three agencies 
provided significant recommendations concerning the potential 
use of advanced information technologies in Congress. 
Recommendations included areas of video conferencing, 
information preservation, and technology available to make it 
easier for members to follow floor action when engaged 
elsewhere. 
The Joint Committee also consulted with numerous other 
groups and individuals concerning reform proposals. Party 
leaders, support agency representatives, academics, state 
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government officials and "think tanks" provided a great deal 
of information to the members of the Joint Committee. 
The committee staff also conducted a series of research 
projects and wrote a series of reports on the various issues 
submitted for consideration. At the conclusion of the 
hearings phase, the Joint Committee retreated to the United 
States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland for two days of 
review and discussions. After the retreat, the Joint 
Committee finalized its efforts and began to issue its 
recommendations. Although the Joint Committee did not have 
the legislative authority to report a bill directly to the 
floor, the Joint Committee leaders agreed to mark up 
legislative language and include it with their final reports. 
Senate Members of the Committee began markups in early 
November, and the House followed between November 16 and ended 
on November 22. The final recommendations of each chamber 
differ concerning many of the issues, and those differences 
will be identified on a case by case basis in the final 
section of this chapter. 
D.   BUDGET REFORM HEARINGS 
The Joint Committee held a series of eight hearings on 
the budget process during March and April, 1993. 
Representative Lee Hamilton began the hearings by describing 
the budget process as highly complex. Representative Wayne 
Allard summed up the general objective of the committee when 
he stated "...one of the major things we could do to make the 
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budget process better is to make it simpler... so that it is 
more easily understood." (Joint Committee Budget Process 
Hearings, March 4, p. 1) 
The Joint Committee called a total of 223 witnesses, 
including the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Budget 
Committee, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, 
nine other members of the House, four Senators, and five 
experts, including the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office. The opinions expressed ranged from advocates of the 
current system who supported minor changes, to those who 
believed a structural overhaul of the budget process was 
required. 
Supporters of the existing budget system included 
Representative Martin Sabo, Chairman of the House Budget 
Committee. Sabo argued that the problem was a lack of 
political agreement, and not the procedure itself. Dr. Robert 
Reischauer, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, 
also supported the current system, and stated, "...the process 
we have now would look a lot better if a $300 billion deficit 
was not staring us in the face. But, we should keep in mind 
that the process is not responsible for that $300 billion 
deficit."  (Joint Committee Hearings, March 4, p. 6) 
Advocates of major reform also voiced their opinions, and 
many witnesses proposed specific modifications to the budget 
process.   Although a  wide  variety of budget  issues  were 
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discussed during the hearings, nine received major attention. 
Each is addressed in detail below. 
1.   Two Year Budget Resolutions and Authorizations 
The first major budget reform proposed concerned biennial 
budgeting. As defined in the committee hearings, biennial 
budgeting includes a 2-year budget resolution and 2-year 
authorizations. The reform was designed to allow authorizing 
committees more time on budget oversight, and less on budget 
authorization. Supporters included Joint Co-chairman Senator 
David Boren, and Senators William Roth and Pete Domenici. 
A major benefit of multi-year budgeting, according to 
Representative William Natcher, was that the authorization 
would be established before the appropriations process began. 
That would eliminate much of the duplication of the 
authorization and appropriation efforts, and was also 
rationalized because many programs and agencies are funded 
without annual authorization bills. 
Most witnesses supported the biennial budget process, but 
some significant opposition developed. Representative George 
Brown, Jr., Chairman of the House Science, Space and 
Technology Committee, argued that multi-year budgeting would 
decrease the participation of authorizers in the annual budget 
process. Programs would have to wait longer for 
implementation if they were proposed in non-authorization 
years. Dr. Reischauer also expressed concerns concerning 
multi-year budgeting, and his arguments were very convincing 
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to many members of the Joint Committee. He stated, "...as one 
who knows how uncertain budget estimates are, even for 1-year 
out, I shudder at the thought of budgeting for a 2-year time 
period..." (Joint Committee Hearings, March 4, p. 5) 
2.   Two Year Appropriations 
Many of the witnesses who favored multi-year 
authorizations also favored multi-year appropriations. Unlike 
authorizations, many appropriations do not change 
substantially from year to year and, therefore, a great deal 
of time is spent with little result. Furthermore, advocates 
argued that biennial appropriations might also result in 
spending reductions because wasteful end-of-year practices 
would be eliminated. Federal agencies would no longer rush to 
spend money before it expired at the end of a fiscal year. 
Proponents also argued that 2-year appropriations would 
eliminate redundant debates on the same issues every year, 
allowing more time for budget oversight. 
Supporters of biennial appropriations included Senator 
Roth and former Vice-President Walter Mondale. Mondale 
suggested that 2-year appropriations make sense and that, "I 
would bet that 85 or 90 percent of an appropriations bill does 
not change in policy. The heart of the appropriations remains 
essentially the same." (Joint Committee Hearings, Jul 1, 
pp. 24-25) 
Because the fiscal stakes would be much higher, many 
opponents, including Dr. Reischauer, suggested that the multi- 
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year appropriations process would actually end up consuming 
more time and become more political. Critics argued that 
since the government is in a fiscal crisis, appropriations 
must be reviewed and approved annually. House members serving 
two-year terms also objected because biennial budgeting would 
allow them only one decision point during the process. A 
leading opponent, Senator Robert Byrd, was quoted as saying 
that, "We don't spend an inordinate amount of the Senate's 
time on the 13 appropriations bills and supplementals; we get 
those done expeditiously." (Joint Committee Hearings, Feb 2, 
p. 26) 
3. Elimination of a Layer in the Budget Process 
The current budget system allows debate on spending 
issues during the three phases of the budget process-the 
budget resolution, authorizations and appropriations. Many 
members of the committee argued for the elimination of a stage 
of the budget process by combining the authorization and 
appropriations process. Senator Nancy Kassenbaum, the leading 
proponent, suggested such a change would eliminate repetition 
in the system, and help the general public better understand 
the process. The strongest and most eloquent argument in 
favor of combining the two processes was provided by former 
Senator Henry Bellmon. Bellmon suggested that "Authorizing 
committees,  in  my  experience,  have  minimal  spending 
restraint It is obvious that the authorizing committees 
have very little concept about what is available to spend. 
60 
r r pri t oul t l i
or im or liti l. c i t
ent l ri i , r pri t
ust ew ua l . ous e bers
- r er j i i l geti oul
low he l i i t r ess.  
e onent, at r obert yrd, as t
t, '  i t ount f enate'
im r pri t il l entals; e t
i o ly.1I i t c mi t eari gs, ,
. )
. l i at er udget r s
r t et e lo at i
r s f get ess-
et l t , t ri t ropriati s. an
e bers mi t i i t f
et bi i t ri t
r pri t ess. at r a as ,
nent, est oul i t eti o
e , l eral bli tt er
ess. ro st ost t ent
bi i as i er
at r enr el on. el m est t IIAuthorizi
mittees, eri ce, i i al i
t ..... It i t t ri mi tees
t t hat ai l .
And by putting those together, that awareness should be 
enhanced." (Joint Committee Hearings, Mar 30, p.22) 
Many members of the committee, as well as witnesses, had 
an opposing viewpoint. Opponents such as Senator Domenici 
argued that the two function as important fiscal checks in the 
legislative system, and that Congress "...didn't want all the 
eggs in one basket." (Joint Committee Hearings, Jan 26, 
p. 78) Opponents suggested that removal of a layer would put 
the entire budget in the same dire situation as mandatory 
spending, monitored but uncontrolled. 
4.   Development of a Leadership Committee 
Senator Kassenbaum also supported the development of a 
leadership committee which would replace the Budget 
Committees. The leadership committee was intended to be more 
directive in nature concerning spending issues in Congress. 
The fiscal directives from the committee would be carried out 
by the authorizing committees. This change is significantly 
different from the current blueprints issued by the Budget 
Committees, but often ignored by Authorizing Committees. 
Former Senator Bellmon also supported a leadership committee 
as a tool to give the budget process more clout. 
Opponents of the leadership committee, including House 
Minority Leader, Representative Bob Michel, suggested that 
congressional leaders were already heavily engaged in other 
committees and, therefore, unable to provide additional time 
to the budget process.  They also pointed out that such a 
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program would restrict the participation in the budget process 
and concentrate a great deal of power in the hands of a few. 
5.   Waiving Budget Rules 
The issue of waiving budget rules probably received more 
attention than any other budget reform considered by the Joint 
Committee. The rules of both chambers concerning the budget 
process are very clear, and yet one of the most vocal 
complaints was how often budget rules and procedures are 
waived or overridden. For instance, both chambers require 
that authorizing committees legislate, and then the 
appropriations committees provide the funding. Often though, 
for the sake of expediency, appropriations bills are passed 
before any authorizing legislation is considered. Both 
chambers came under fire, as did both authorizers and 
appropriators. 
Witnesses supporting the claim that there are too many 
exemptions to the rules blamed the Rules Committees. 
Representative Michel stated in his March 30 testimony, "It 
has gotten to the point that the House Rules Committee 
provides blanket waivers and doesn't bother to specify which 
points of order are being violated." (Joint Committee 
Hearings, March 11, p. 15) 
Many authorizers in the House expressed concern about the 
Senate and its Appropriations Committees. In the House, 
membership is exclusive, but in the Senate some Senators chair 
both an authorizing committee and its relevant appropriations 
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subcommittee. Appropriation bills are easier to legislate 
because members can avoid amendments and lengthy debates. 
Therefore, the Senate has found a procedure that excludes 
authorizers in both chambers from the policymaking process, 
and causes significant problems when the legislation goes to 
conference. Speaker of the House Thomas Foley summed up the 
problem quite well, "...it is difficult sometimes to ...(move 
authorizations through) the Senate because of the tendency of 
the Senate to move these questions through the appropriations 
process."(Joint Committee Hearings, Jan 26, p. 12) 
The authorization-appropriations process is also 
corrupted by numerous interpretations of the rules. Co- 
Chairman Boren suggested that often authorizing committee 
chairmen contact appropriation chairmen in an attempt to 
include certain legislation in the appropriations bill which 
they could not enact in the authorization bill. Appropriators 
are not obliged to support such a request, but often the 
request is honored in exchange for future votes from the 
authorizing committee chairman, i.e., logrolling. 
6.   Sunsetting Entitlement Legislation 
A distinction between entitlement and discretionary 
funding is required for the remainder of this section. 
Entitlement programs (trustfund spending) provide 
beneficiaries with a commitment from the federal government to 
provide some quantity of financial assistance through existing 
legislation.  Entitlement programs include Social Security, 
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Medicare and Medicaid. Discretionary spending is money 
not already promised through legislation, and includes 
defense and other domestic spending such as highways and 
education. 
Mandatory, or entitlement spending continues to grow 
faster than discretionary spending, and already accounts for 
more than half of federal expenditures. In order to reduce 
the federal deficit, entitlement spending must be reduced. 
Many of the witnesses testified in support of controlling 
entitlement spending, and proposed that the programs be 
reviewed every few years to determine which are still 
worthwhile, and hence subject to renewal. Programs not deemed 
worthwhile would be cancelled, sunsetting the legislation. 
Supporters of sunset legislation, including Vice-chairman 
Drier and Dr. Reischauer, argued that this legislation would 
give Congress more spending choices by freeing up some money 
considered off limits under an entitlement program. 
Other issues considered included periodic reviews of 
entitlement programs. Co-Chairman Boren recommended that 
mandatory programs be limited by growth rates of appropriate 
measures, such as the cost of living or population growth 
rates. Others argued for termination dates for entitlement 
programs, unless Congress took action to renew them every few 
years. 
7.   Baseline Budgeting 
Baseline budgeting is a projection of future expenditures 
64 
edicar edicai . i r o o
t read i hrou , n u
esti gh
cati .
andator  I t tlem t t o
h ion i , rea t
or h l l endit res.
r l ficit, t tlem t ust .
a it ie ort tr l n
t tlem t i , t a
iew e r r i hi
ort hile, j t al. a t
ort hil oul cell , sett i .
pporter s t i , i C r
ri r r. ei auer, t i io oul
ongres or i i e n one
si f i it er t tlem t .
ot r si u r i e f
t  le t s. o- hai or ecom e t
andat r s i i t f r pri t
easures, st f iv n r pulat t
. ot r i t t t tlem t
s, l ongress t he  r  
ars.
. aseli  udgeti  
aseli  geti  r j t  f endit r  
 
determined by expected inflation and mandated changes in the 
program. The problem with baseline budgeting is that budget 
cuts are usually calculated from the projected baseline rather 
than the previous year's spending levels. This gives 
politicians a way to appear to cut programs without actually 
cutting spending. 
Opponents of baseline budgeting argued that such actions 
actually lead to a larger escalation in spending than would 
otherwise occur. Reguiring committees to base their estimates 
on the previous year levels of spending, vice the baseline, 
might result in less pressure to allow program growth. 
However, since most entitlement spending automatically 
receives a cost of living allowance every year, baseline 
budgeting has become an institutional norm in both chambers 
of Congress. 
8.   Line-Item Veto 
The Presidential line-item veto, a perennial request of 
Presidents Reagan and Bush, would allow the President to 
eliminate specific items in a spending bill without vetoing 
the entire bill. Supporters of the line-item veto suggest 
that the President does not have a small constituency like 
Senators and Representatives and, therefore, is more willing 
to slash wasteful spending from appropriation bills. 
Opponents of the line-item veto suggest that such an 
instrument may violate the separation of powers clause of the 
Constitution.  They argue that such a tool shifts power  to 
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the President concerning spending cuts and, therefore, gives 
the Executive Branch the power of the purse. Representative 
Bill Orten stated, "I legitimately am concerned about giving 
the President that much power. We can barely get 218 votes on 
many of these things. If you have to get two-thirds, you 
can't do it. So the President would control the purse." 
(Joint Committee Hearings, March 18, p. 50) 
It was argued that a line-item veto would allow Congress 
to avoid making tough cuts, therefore forcing the President to 
cut the programs. However, many argued that Congress has been 
able to cut spending through the rescission process, and that 
the President doesn't need to get involved in specific budget 
matters to that extent. 
A modified line-item veto was suggested by Representative 
Stenholm during his testimony. His proposal avoided the 
constitutional question by allowing the President to sign an 
appropriation bill, and then send a list of proposed 
rescissions from the bill back to Congress. A simple majority 
vote would approve the rescission. Congress would have the 
option on acting on these proposed "suggestions." 
9.   Balanced-Budget Constitutional Amendment 
"The best starting place for budget reform is a 
constitutional amendment reguiring a balanced-budget." That 
statement, made by Representative Stenholm during his 
testimony (Joint Committee Hearings, Mar 4, p. 2), 
demonstrated that balancing the budget was a major priority 
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for the American public. Supporters argued that many attempts 
to fix the budget process have all failed because of loopholes 
in the budget process. 
Opponents, including Dr. Reischauer, testified that a 
constitutional amendment would tie the hands of Congress, and 
would prevent flexibility for unforeseen occurrences, such as 
the Gulf War. In his March 4 testimony, Dr. Reischauer stated 
"...budget procedures are much better at enforcing compliance 
with previous decisions than at forcing predetermined goals." 
(Joint Committee Hearings, March 4, p. 6) 
E.   ROUNDTABLE ON BUDGET PROCESS REFORM 
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the hearings on 
budget reform, the Joint Committee held a roundtable 
discussion concerning budget reform. The roundtable 
discussion was held at the United States Capitol on April 15, 
1993. The discussion was moderated by James Thurber, the 
Director of the Center for Congressional and Presidential 
Studies. The roundtable was attended by a variety of current 
and former congressional staff, as well as outside experts and 
academics. A brief summary of the important points addressed 
at this forum is contained below. 
1.   Budget Reform Necessity 
The first issue guestioned the necessity of budget 
reform, and the group failed to come to a consensus on the 
matter. The famous guote from former CBO Director, Rudolph 
Penner, became the focal point of discussion: "The process 
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isn't the problem, the problem is the problem." (Boren, 1993, 
p. 205) The argument centered around the deficit, and many 
suggested that changing the process would not significantly 
impact the deficit. They suggested that the current process, 
although not ideal, certainly was capable of producing better 
budgetary results. Most believed that budget reform diverted 
Congress from more important issues. 
The group was divided on the issue of budget reform, and 
one member suggested that the focus on budget reform reflected 
a much broader set of concerns facing Congress. He indicated 
that a fear of politics has resulted in a belief that the 
process is untouchable. To solve the budget problem he 
suggested that instead of reform, a new commission on budget 
concepts, similar to the commission of 1967, would be more 
responsive to the needs of Congress. The 1967 Commission was 
responsible for many successful procedures that improved 
federal budgeting, and some of their work appeared in 
subsequent legislation. 
Leadership in the federal budget process was another area 
identified for improvement. Participants suggested a wide 
variety of ideas include making the process more political 
and, therefore, more responsive to leadership. Others 
suggested that since budgeting is a congressional-presidential 
process, a major leadership change is required if the system 
is expected to produce better results. 
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The discussion focused on the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and its objectives. One 
member suggested that the Budget Act was designed to provide 
better budgetary information and coordination of the budget, 
not designed to eliminate deficits, and that to evaluate the 
process only on deficits was unreasonable. 
A separate proposal included the possibility of 
eliminating the budget resolution and returning the procedure 
to the pre-1974 process. Many roundtable members agreed with 
the suggestion, and even implied that eliminating the budget 
resolution would probably cause more executive-legislative 
budget summits, that might help to reduce spending. 
Other members suggested that the budget system should 
take advantage of institutional strengths. Congress had 
failed to perform the role of the executive branch to 
formulate successful budget policy, while allowing the 
President to abandon his responsibilities for budget policy. 
Congress's strength lies in readjusting priorities within a 
broad policy, not attempting to formulate the policy. 
Congress seldom has deviated significantly from the 
President's budget reguests, and eliminating the congressional 
budget resolution could significantly improve the budget 
process and the work of the budget committees. 
2.   The Joint Committee's Role in Budget Process Reform 
The second formal question proposed by Dr. Thurber 
concerned the role of the Joint Committee in the budget reform 
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process.  Although no one suggested that the Joint Committee 
had little business dealing with budget reform, they did 
indicate that energy was being wasted.  Without authority 
to propose legislation for reform,  many felt the Joint 
Committee's efforts would go for naught. 
3. Biennial Budgeting 
The roundtable discussion turned to more specific issues 
and a variety of them received a great deal of discussion. 
The first, biennial budgeting, was considered impractical 
because they required budget projections that usually were 
three years into the future. Others felt that biennial 
budgeting was a way to reduce both the deficit and the 
congressional workload, but that it probably wouldn't reduce 
either. 
One member of the roundtable indicated that budgeting is 
not annual, but that the process is annual. Any desire to 
make budget decisions every other year would be outweighed by 
the desire to avoid making bad decisions. An annual budget 
allows maximum flexibility, even if Congress only makes 
incremental budget changes. 
4. Combining Authorizations and Appropriations 
The next issue concerned the possibility of combining 
authorizations and appropriations. The consensus was that 
such a reform was needed because of continuing conflict 
between authorizers and appropriators over who "gets to spend 
the money." One member pointed out that authorized levels for 
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most programs are substantially higher than the appropriations 
for those programs, and combining the two would result in 
greater spending instead of a reduction. 
5.   Additional Comments On Budget Reform 
Members of the Roundtable were offered an opportunity to 
suggest additional areas for budget reform. Participants 
provided a number of suggestions, but the focus of their 
efforts concerned entitlement spending. Suggestions included 
limiting entitlements to appropriated amounts, and granting 
tax committees broad jurisdiction over both entitlements and 
revenues. Both of those suggestions were considered highly 
unlikely to occur. 
In summary, the Roundtable panel implied that the best 
budget process allows Congress to decide which guestions are 
important and which are not. In that context, reforms 
concerning appropriations were considered unnecessary and 
biennial budgeting a step in the wrong direction. Finally, 
they concluded that any reform which brought the tax 
committees directly into the budget process would have 
positive effects. 
F.   SURVEY RESULTS 
One of the many tools used by the Joint Committee was a 
series of surveys sent to both members and their staff on 
specific reform proposals and issues that should be brought to 
the attention of the Committee. The Congressional Research 
Service and the Congressional Management Foundation were the 
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primary assistants in this project. The validity of the 
surveys was hindered by the low return rate among members. 
Only thirty percent of members returned the questionnaires 
whereas almost fifty percent of 3500 staff members responded. 
The responses of members are tabulated in Table 4. 
Over seventy percent of the respondents supported the 
elimination of one of the steps in the budget process. Of 
those, forty percent indicated that the appropriations process 
should be eliminated and seventeen percent suggested combining 
authorizations and appropriations. 
Table 4 
Congressional Members Survey Response 
(Source: Report on the Organization of Congress, House 
Report 103-413/Senate Report 103-215, Volume II) 
Favor Neutral Oppose 
Make Budget Committee 
into a Leadership 
Committee 
25. 3% 13 . 0 51.9 
Joint Budget Committee 28.8 19 . 0 42 .5 
"Sunset" Entitlement 
Programs 
74 . 2 11.9 11.9 
Two-Year Resolution/ 
Authorization 
69. 0 5. 1 17.7 
Two-Year Authorization/ 
Appropriation 
56.9 10. 5 20.9 
Joint Budget Resolution 40.4 15.2 28.5 
Eliminate Concurrent 
Resolution 
31.2 21. 4 31.2 
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Two specific budget reform proposals, "sunsetting" 
entitlement legislation and biennial budgeting, were strongly 
supported by more than two-thirds of the respondents. Of 
general interest, a greater number of junior members favored 
"sunsetting" entitlement  programs.  (Boren,   193,  p. 229) 
Staff members were also surveyed, but were asked 
different guestions than members. The results indicated 
support for two budget reform issues. Seventy-one percent 
favored a two-year budget process, and fifty-five percent 
supported the creation of a leadership committee. (Boren, 
1993, p. 339) 
G.    FINAL REPORT FINDINGS 
The final three months of the Joint Committee were not as 
successful as the first six months. Partisan disagreements, 
procedural difficulties and political gamesmanship paralyzed 
the Committee. Tensions between the House and Senate ran so 
high that they issued separate recommendations, even though 
many proposals were identical. 
The Joint Committee anticipated completing its work by 
September, and Speaker of the House Foley promised to 
introduce many report recommendations to the floor in October. 
However, October passed without a single measure coming to the 
House floor. 
1.   House Recommendations 
Disagreements between Democrats and Republicans slowed 
the recommendations of the House members  of the Joint 
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Committee. After weeks of inaction, Representative Hamilton 
released his own recommendations on November 16. Vice- 
chairman Dreier called the recommendations "neither bipartisan 
nor comprehensive." (Congress and the Nation, 1993, p. 28) 
Over the next few days, House members of the Joint 
Committee angrily debated 36 amendments, most from 
Republicans. The debates were often partisan and occasionally 
turned personal. On November 22, 1993, the House completed 
its markup, voting mostly along party lines, 8-4 to adopt the 
recommendations. Two Republicans, Vice-chairman Dreier and 
Representative Emerson broke ranks and supported the final 
bill. 
The House members recommended five budget reforms in 
their final report. They supported biennial budgeting; 
quarterly CBO budget reports; development of fiscal and budget 
policy reports; a review of government user fees; and total of 
tax expenditures in budget resolutions. Two of these, 
biennial budgeting and quarterly CBO reports were also 
recommended by the Senate. 
2.   Senate Recommendations 
The Senators on the committee adopted their 
recommendations by a vote of 12-0 on November 10, after a 
single day of markup. They opted to defer any recommendations 
concerning ethics issues, while the Senate Ethics Committee 
Chairman Richard Bryan, studied the matter under a separate 
charter. 
74 
c mi tee. ft r ee s t , epresentat a ilt
e i co endati s ove ber . i -
rm rei r l co endati s i r i rt
r prehensive. gres ati , 3, . )
ver t e s, ous e bers i t
o mi t ri t endments, ost rom
epublicans. at er rt si all
r nal. ove ber , 3, ous plet
ar up, t ostl r , t
endations. epublicans, i rm rei r
epresentat ers rt l
ill.
ous e bers ecom e et or
i l rt. rt i i l geti ;
art r get rts; ent l get
l rts; e ent r ; l
endit r et l t s. ,
i i l geti art r S rt er
ecom e nate.
. t e mendatio s
at r mi t t i
co endati s t ove ber ,
l ar up. t f r co endati s
r s, hil at t i o mi t
hai i r an, a t r er r t
art r.
The Senate's report, S. R. 103-215, made five 
recommendations concerning budget reform. It recommended 
biennial budgeting and appropriating; multi-year 
authorizations; the development of quarterly deficit reports; 
clarification of section 313 of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act; and GAO assistance with oversight 
responsibility. 
The final report of the Joint Committee was released 
three months later than expected, on December 9, 1993.  In 
accordance with  the  authorizing  legislation,  the Joint 
Committee dissolved on December 31, 1993. 
H.   SUMMARY 
The time appeared to be right in 1992 for a major 
institutional review and reform of congressional procedures. 
Americans were increasingly frustrated with Congress, and the 
result was a Joint Committee to make a full and complete 
study of the organization and operation of the Congress of the 
United States. 
The Joint Committee was chartered to recommend 
improvements to strengthen the effectiveness of Congress, 
simplify its operations, improve its relationships with and 
oversight of other branches of the government and improve the 
orderly consideration of legislation. What became of the 
recommendations? How many of the reforms have been 
implemented? Those questions are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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VI.  OUTCOME OF THE REFORM EFFORT 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was 
established to consider improvements to strengthen Congress, 
simplify its operations, improve its relationships with and 
oversight of other branches of the government and improve the 
orderly consideration of legislation. After six months of 
testimony, symposia and surveys, and three months of 
disagreements over conclusions, the final report was 
released in December 1993. By the close of 1993, the Joint 
Committee had spent over $640,000 and produced a final report 
proposing only modest changes.  (Carney, 1994, p. 1733) 
B. HOUSE ACTION 
House members of the Joint Committee submitted their 
legislation and remained relatively optimistic about its 
chances. Representative Lee Hamilton noted that the 1965 
Joint Committee did not get its package passed until 1970. He 
stated, "I think the package will be passed. Now, the tougher 
question is will it be passed in 1994? I don't know the 
answer to that."  (Carney, 1994, p. 1737) 
The final report of the House Members of the Joint 
Committee did not fare as well as Representative Hamilton had 
hoped. The report suffered a "quick" legislative death. 
House leaders first attempted to split the recommendations 




i t c mi t o i t f ongress as
sh si r r ents ren ongress,
pli erati s, r io it
ersi t r ent r
r si r t i . ft r ont s f
tim , posi s, ont s f
a ee ent r cl si s, l rt as
e e ber 3. f 3, i t
mi t t r , l rt
s l odest ges. r ey, 4, . ) 
.
ous e bers i t o mi te itt i
io ai v ti isti t
ces. epresentat a ilt t t  
i t mi t t t til 0. 
, ill s . O , r
est ill   n't
er t. r , 4, . ) 
l rt ous embers f i t
mi t t ell epresentati a ilt
ed. rt i i at .
ous r tem t lit co endati s
r t ill . ill t l f
reforms and the other contained only one, applying private 
sector laws to Congress. This division of the legislation 
eliminated much of the support for the more controversial 
recommendations, and effectively tabled the most important 
recommendations in the legislation. 
Reluctantly, Speaker of the House Foley put the 
legislation on the House schedule, but placed it below other 
important issues facing the 103rd Congress. Among those 
issues were campaign finance reform, legislation banning 
lobbyists' gifts, and health care reform. When the 103rd 
Congress adjourned in late 1994, the congressional reform 
legislation was still waiting to be considered. In the view 
of many House members, Speaker Foley had effectively avoided 
the issue of congressional reform. 
Republican House members saw a political opportunity 
caused by the delays and, led by Representative Newt Gingrich 
of Georgia, developed a "Contract With America." The contract 
encompassed many congressional reforms contained in the final 
House report of the Joint Committee. The November, 1994 
elections provided sweeping changes, and the Republicans 
gained control of both chambers for the first time since the 
1950's. The role that the "Contract" and its congressional 
reform portions has played in the 1994 elections remains to be 
studied. 
C.   SENATE ACTION 
Although not enthusiastic about reform, Senate Majority 
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Leader Mitchell did not hinder the legislation as did Speaker 
Foley. Senate Rules Committee Chairman Wendell H. Ford took 
the recommendations from the final Senate Report and developed 
a legislative package for submission to the full Senate. 
Resistance was strong, especially from Senator Byrd, 
Appropriations Committee Chairman and a "guardian of Senate 
traditions". (Gettinger, 1994, p. 1503) Senator Byrd 
convinced the Rules Committee to delete the recommendation for 
a two-year budget cycle. The committee supported the 
recommendation for two-year authorizations, but deleted the 
recommendation for two-year appropriations. Such a proposal 
effectively amounts to no change at all. 
The modest package of proposals designed to make the 
Senate function more efficiently was met with a great deal of 
disdain. Ford's committee eventually voted to drop most of 
the key recommendations from the Senate Report, and only minor 
elements made it to the Senate floor. Ford worked many days 
attempting to convince his colleagues, but admitted it was too 
difficult to change old habits on Capitol Hill. Senator Ford 
observed, "When you go up against the big bulls, the little 
bulls don't have much chance,..." (Carney, 1994, p. 173) 
Why was the Senate leadership so reluctant to endorse the 
changes recommended by the Joint Committee? Senators such as 
Senator Byrd, were highly unlikely to support any 
recommendations  that  limited  their  influence among their 
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peers, and proposals such as biennial budgeting could greatly 
reduce their power. 
Secondly, enthusiasm for congressional reform quickly 
evaporated when a more encompassing problem and its associated 
reform appeared on the political agenda. As the Joint 
Committee was completing its final report, President Clinton 
was proposing sweeping changes to the health care system in 
the United States. The health care debate would take center 
stage, and no other reforms could hold the attention of 
Congress or the nation. The Health care reform impact on the 
outcome of the final report of the Joint Committee is 
addressed below. 
D.   WERE THE REFORM CRITERIA PRESENT IN 1993? 
We may reiterate from chapter III that three criteria 
appear to be required for successful reform to occur. These 
three criteria—perception of an existing problem, public 
support and a catalyst--were present in 1992 (as noted in 
chapter V) . But, were they still present in 1993 when 
Congress began to act on the Joint Committee's 
recommendations? To answer that question, each of the 
criteria will be examined in some detail below. 
1.   Existence of a Problem 
An interesting development happened during the summer of 
1993 that impacted the first criterion for successful reform. 
Shortly after his inauguration in January 1993, President 
Clinton, at the insistence of many key advisors, proposed a 
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serious deficit reduction bill for Fiscal Year 1994. Clinton 
was concerned that the federal deficit comprised 4.9 percent 
of GNP in 1992. His advisors developed a complex budget plan 
that survived a bruising battle in Congress throughout the 
summer of 1993. The budget battle on Capital Hill did not 
end until August 6, 1993 with the passage of the 
reconciliation bill. The narrow, one-vote victory on the bill 
contributed to reducing the federal deficit from nearly $290 
billion in 1992 to $250 billion in 1994 followed by a deficit 
of only $157 billion in Fiscal Year 1995. (Morgan, 1995, p. 
193) 
Many Americans perceived the deficit reduction package as 
a serious effort by President Clinton to keep his campaign 
promises of cutting the deficit in half during his first term. 
This legislation may also have reduced public concern over the 
size of the federal deficit. Some Americans voters perceived 
that the problem was finally being resolved in Washington. 
However, Americans were unaware that later in the decade, the 
deficit was projected to grow to levels in excess of the large 
deficits of the 1980's. Therefore, the federal budget problem 
still remained, despite voter perception that the problem was 
less severe. 
2.   Public Support 
The second criterion, public support, also underwent a 
significant change during the 1992-1993 time period. As 
mentioned above, Clinton's deficit reduction package reduced 
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the anxiety level of American voters,  and reduced their 
support for congressional budget reform.  More importantly, 
though, public attention was shifted to a new source of 
reform, i.e., the health care system in the United States. 
By some standards, the fiscal climate for health care 
reform was ideal for the 103rd Congress. The substantial 
deficit reduction package enacted in 1993, and a slowly but 
steadily improving economy produced improved forecasts for 
future deficits. (Doyle, 1994, p.15) Many members of 
Congress were optimistic about reform, and for the first time 
since the 1960's Congress was filled with a sense of enacting 
a piece of sweeping social legislation. However, health care 
reform's temporary gain was budget reform's loss. 
3.   Catalyst To Initiate Reform 
In 1993, health care reform exploded onto the political 
scene, drawing with it much of the public's attention. Health 
care reform first seriously appeared on the American political 
agenda in 1991. Harris Wofford used the issue to propel him 
to a come-from-behind victory in a special Senate election in 
the State of Pennsylvania. Wofford won because of his simple 
call for health care reform. "If criminals have the right to 
a lawyer, I think working Americans should have the right to 
a doctor," was the theme of his television advertisements. 
(Cook, 1994, p. 26) Wofford's victory shocked the political 
establishment,  caught  many  Republicans   off   guard, and 
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provided the Democratic party the ammunition for national 
victories in 1992. 
Bill Clinton defeated President Bush in the 1992 
presidential elections for a wide variety of reasons, but 
among important issues was his call for health care reform. 
In some ways, Clinton's attempt to reform America's 
health-care system was compared to the New Deal of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt or the Great Society of President Lyndon 
B. Johnson. The effect was thought to be sweeping, and 
certainly it would impact Americans socially and economically. 
Health care reform became the primary political issue of 
1993. President Clinton's formal plan faced severe 
competition from several other health care reform 
alternatives. The debate over health care reform suppressed 
other legislation, including budget reform. 
E.   FAILURE OF REFORM 
For all the lip service given to change at the start of 
the 103rd Congress, reform advocates on Capital Hill had 
surprisingly little to show for their efforts. There are four 
reasons why reform was unsuccessful. First, the few modest 
proposals that survived the Joint Committee process were 
killed by lack of support from party leaders in both chambers. 
Even members of the Joint Committee, such as Vice-chairman 
Peter Domenici, a major advocate of reform, were quoted as 
saying, "I'm not very impressed with the product." (Carney, 
1994, p. 1735) 
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The second cause of failure was a change in perception. 
Americans came to view the deficit problem as being addressed 
by the new president, and their fears were somewhat 
alleviated. 
Thirdly, the issue of health care reform drew public 
attention away from congressional reform. Finally, although 
health care reform had been an important issue since 1991, it 
became a subject of great interest to most Americans in 1993, 
when President Clinton presented his formal plan to the 
nation. As a catalyst, it overwhelmed other legislation being 
considered by the 103rd Congress. It became the single most 
dominant issue in American politics, sweeping other reforms 
off the political agenda. Reforms such as campaign finance 
and congressional reform could not survive in the political 
arena dominated by health care issues. 
This new catalyst and the fading interest in 
congressional budget reform were signals that the efforts of 
the Joint Committee were essentially futile. Ironically, 
Congress did not approve a health care reform bill during the 
103rd Congress. Yet, congressional enthusiasm for health care 
reform caused other important legislation to be tabled 
indefinitely. The issues of health care reform and 
congressional budget reform, as well as many others, would be 
passed to the 104th Congress, elected in 1994, the first 
Republican-led Congress in more than forty years. 
84 
as r ti .
eric s e fi it e r
r i nt,
.
i er e hat
hir l , l form e bli
e o rom gressi al . i all , tho
l form port t 1,
j t t t ost eric s 3,
he r t li t i al
t . s t l st, r i io
si r ongress. l ost
inant eri lit , ee i r or
f lit l a. ef s pai ina
gressi al form l t lit l
inat l s.
hi t l st t
gressi al get form er l t rt
i t o mi t er ti l ti . i all ,
ongres t l form ill r
r ongress. et, gressi al asm l
form r port t i io
efi it l . l form
gressi al et , ell a t rs, oul
t ongress, 4,
epubli -l ongres or ars.
F.   CAN CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REFORM EVER BE ACHIEVED? 
Are congressional budget reforms necessary, or can 
Congress control the budget under the current system? As 
stated, the call for major budget reforms can be related 
directly to the perception of inability to control the federal 
deficit and debt. Deficiencies in the 1974 Budget Act have 
contributed to a growing deficit. Of the nearly $5 trillion 
national debt, nearly 90 percent has accumulated over the last 
twenty years. (Cox, 1995, p. A10) The fragmentation of the 
congressional budget process has been a significant 
contributor to the size of the national debt. 
First, consider the recent growth of entitlement 
spending. It is obviously much harder to constrain 
entitlement spending than it is to cut discretionary spending. 
Few Americans realize that most of the growth in federal 
spending is due to entitlement spending. 
According to Schick, (1995, p. 203) at least four major 
reforms would strengthen the executive's power in the budget 
process and, therefore, could improve federal budgeting. 
Those four are the line-item veto, biennial appropriations, 
enhanced recission authority, and a statutory budget 
resolution. Too often, Schick notes, Congress is labeled the 
irresponsible branch of government. However, he points out 
that a strong case can be made that Presidents are more likely 
than Congress to ignore budget ceilings. "As long as 
Presidents plunge ahead with legislative agendas that break 
85 
.  NGRE SI  E     CHI ED? 
re ngressi nal udget r s ece sary, r  
ongress ntrol t  udget nder t  rr nt ? s 
t t , t  all r ajor udget r s  e l  
i tl    er pti  f bilit  t  ntrol t  eral 
eficit  ebt. efici ci s    udget ct e 
ntr t   i  eficit. f  earl   lio  
at al ebt, arl   r t as ulat  er  t 
ent  ears. ox, 95, . la) he entati  f  
gressi al get r ss s  i t 
tr t r  f t al ebt. 
irst, si r t t  f t lem t 
i . i sl uc r r str i  
t tlem t i t i io i g. 
eric s l t ost f t r l
i t tlem t i .
ccor i i , , . ) t t aj r
form oul ren h cuti e' er et
, r , l r r l geti .
h ine-item t , i l r priat s,
io t rit ,  u et
. , t , ngres a h
rresp ent. ever, i t t
 tron t or ik
tha gr to ig t in . lon
t u i le iv
85 
the budget but Congress gets blamed for the damage, Americans 
will get the programs they want and the deficits they do not 
want." (Schick, 1995, p. 203) 
On the other hand, some argue that selected budget 
reforms may be unconstitutional, and that Congress must work 
within the framework it already has established for itself. 
The solution to the federal budget problem may be for members 
to regain control of the substantive issues within the budget 
rather than reforming the process. According to Neal Devins, 
(1990, p. 1020) imploring the voters to hold Congress 
accountable for deficit spending is a better solution than 
structural reform because structural reform may alter the 
constitutional balance of power between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. 
G.   WHERE DOES CONGRESS GO FROM HERE? 
Will the 104th Congress consider the final report of the 
Joint Committee? It appears that it may fall on "deaf ears" 
because of other budget process reforms now being considered 
by the Republican-led Congress. Nearly two hundred members of 
both the House and Senate have co-sponsored a Budget Process 
Reform Act, to be introduced in late 1995. The supporters, 
both Democrats and Republicans, are reintroducing this 
legislation after the 103rd Congress failed to take action on 
the bill. 
The bill would reguire the President and Congress to 
commit together to a blueprint on the federal budget, and once 
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it was established, the President's detailed budget would be 
submitted to Congress. This would focus the budget at a 
macro-level, allowing details to be negotiated later. 
Congress would be prohibited from considering spending bills 
until the one-page budget is completed. Spending in excess of 
the budgeted amount would require a two-thirds vote. The plan 
allows members to vote for local funding issues, but if they 
are defeated on the vote, it provides political cover, 
allowing them to blame defeat on the system. 
The bill also incorporates some creative solutions to 
difficult problems. A line-item reduction tool, similar to a 
line-item veto, is granted to the president to prevent over 
spending. The new process also is designed to check 
entitlement spending by adopting a proposal recently endorsed 
by President Clinton's bipartisan Entitlement Commission. 
Federal entitlement programs, except Social Security and 
interest on the debt, would have their spending levels decided 
by Congress annually. The administering agencies would then 
determine how to adjust benefits and stay within budget. 
Finally, the bill incorporates automatic continuing resolution 
authority in case Congress and the President fail to reach a 
timely budget agreement. (Cox, 1995, p. A10) 
H.   AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are questions left unanswered by this study, and 
some may be interesting future research topics. Among the 
most notable are: What types of budget reform can be expected 
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from the 104th Congress? Which reforms will be major issues 
in the 1996 national elections? Does a line-item veto violate 
the Constitution? What factors affect the outcome of the 
Budget Process Reform Act? Are bipartisan efforts to reduce 
the growth of entitlement programs likely to succeed in a 
government environment where the President is from one party 
and Congress the other? 
I.   SUMMARY 
The Joint Committee completed its work in late 1993 and 
submitted separate reports to the two chambers of Congress. 
The final reports failed to reach the floor for debate in 
either chamber. House leaders split the recommendations into 
two separate bills, destroying much needed support, and Senate 
leaders let the report die in committee hearings. Although 
the first six months of the Joint Committee were relatively 
effective in articulating reform proposals, the final three 
months were characterized by bipartisan disputes and inter- 
chamber rivalries. The 103rd Congress adjourned with 
congressional budget process reform one of many important 
topics not really addressed in any serious way. 
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